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INTRODUCTION
On August 8, 1997, the first and third largest producers of civilian
jets, The Boeing Company ("Boeing") and McDonnell Douglas Cor-
poration ("McDonnell Douglas") merged to form a single company
with combined annual sales of approximately $48 billion.' With the
loss of McDonnell Douglas as an independent corporation, only Boe-
ing and Airbus Industries ("Airbus") 2 remained to compete in the
global market for large commercial aircraft, estimated to be worth
$1.1 trillion over the next twenty years. Boeing's acquisition of
McDonnell Douglas pushed its nearly two-thirds share of the market
to seventy percent.4  The capture of such a significant share of the
market prompted the Federal Trade Commission to investigate the
merger, yet after review, the FTC concluded that Boeing's acquisition
would not "substantially lessen competition"5 and it approved the
6merger.
The FTC's approval, however, was not the end of the debate over
the competitive effects of the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger.
Directorate General IV of the European Commission ("Commis-
sion"), the European Union's ("EU") antitrust authority7 did not
1. SeeJeff Cole & Thomas E. Ricks, Boeing's Militay-Aircraft Operations to Be in St. Louis Un-
der Merger Deal, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 1997, at A5 (reporting merger of Boeing and McDonnell
Douglas).
2. See Commission Decision of 97/816, 1997 O.J. (L 336) 16, 19-20 [hereinafter Boeing-
McDonnell Douglas Decision] (describing Airbus); Charles Goldsmith, Re-Engineering After
Trailing Boeing for Years, Airbus Aims for 50% of the Market, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 1998, at Al
(discussing the history of Airbus and its current goals). Airbus was established in December
1971 as a consortium of economic interests. Airbus is collectively owned by privately-owned
Daimler-Benz Aerospace Airbus of Germany and British Aerospace, and government-owned
Aerosatiale of France and CASA of Spain. See Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Decision, supra, at
19-20.
3. SeeJeff Cole et al., Boeing-McDonnell Merger Clears Hurdle, WALL ST. J., July 24, 1997, at
A2 (reporting that Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger will leave only "two players"-Boeing
and Airbus-to compete in the global market for large civilian jets, estimated to be worth $1.1
trillion over the next 20 years).
4. See Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Decision, supra note 2, at 24 (indicating Boeing's in-
crease in market share from 64% to 70%).
5. See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994) (prohibiting mergers which "may be substantially to lessen
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly").
6. See In re Boeing Company/McDonnell Douglas Corp., FTC, file no. 971-0051 (July 1,
1997) (statement of Chairman Robert Pitofsky and Commissioners Janet D. Steiger, Roscoe B.
Starek III & Christine A. Varney) (approving the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger).
7. See generally RALPH H. FOLSOM, EUROPEAN UNION LAW 66-68 (2d ed. 1995) (giving gen-
eral explanation of Commission's organization). The Commission is organized by Directorate
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share the FTC's confidence that the merger would not substantially
lessen competition." The EU 9 feared a strengthening of Boeing's
dominant position in the global market for large civilian jets, which
post-merger would be served by only two competitors.0
As the deadline for the Commission's official statement on the
merger approached, the prospects that the EU would approve the
$14 billion deal dimmed." Concerned U.S. lawmakers rejected the
EU's authority to prevent the merger, 2 suggesting that EU concerns
Generals, essentially departments, numbering I through XXII. Each Directorate General
("DG") is allocated particular administrative, legislative, drafting, and enforcement duties. DG
IV is in charge of competition. See id.
8. See Commission Begins Investigation of the Boeing/McDonnel Douglas Merger, OFFICIAL PRESS
RELEASE OF THE EUR. UNION IP/97/236 (Eur. Comm'n, Brussels, BeIg.), Mar. 19, 1997, at 1
[hereinafter Commission Begins Investigation] (stating the Commission's concern that merger in
its initial form posed significant impediments to competition).
9. See EUROPEAN COMM'N, SERVING THE EUROPEAN UNION (1996) (explaining roles of the
various bodies within the EU). "EU" is used in this Comment to refer to the European Union
as a whole. Although the Commission investigated and ultimately decided the compatibility of
the merger with EC Law, much like the FTC would in the United States, for the purposes of
this Comment it is assumed that the Commission is a representative of the EU. Thus, concerns
expressed and decisions made by the Commission are considered to have been made by the
whole of the EU.
10. See Commission Begins Investigation, supra note 8 (announcing Commission's decision to
proceed with a phase two investigation of Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger).
11. SeeAlex Fryer &James V. Grimaldi, Rebuff Sends Boeing Packing, SEATTLE TIMES,July 16,
1997, at C1 (noting that an EU advisory panel voted a second time to deny merger approval
absent concessions from Boeing, and that negotiations between Boeing and the Commission
had reached a standstill). Disapproval of the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger would essen-
tially mean that the Commission concluded the merger would lead to a strengthening of Boe-
ing's already dominant position in the commercial aircraft industry and, as a consequence, be
incompatible with EC Law. See infra Part IA (discussing the Merger Regulation). Talks be-
tween Boeing and the EU continued, butjust days before the date of the EU's official decision,
it appeared only a "miracle" would bring the parties to a compromise. See Brian Coleman, U.S.
May Retaliate IfEU Rjects Boeing Merger, WALL ST.J.,July 18, 1997, at A2. Senior European avia-
tion officials reportedly referred to the crisis (i.e., the possibility that the EU would disapprove
the merger) as "a nightmare they'd rather not think about." Charles Goldsmith,Forces Opposing
Merger Are Gaining Strength in the EU, WALL ST. J. EUR., July 17, 1997, at A2 (reporting the pessi-
mistic view held by U.S. authorities about the prospects of EU approval). The estimated cost of
acquiring McDonnell Douglas was between $14 billion to $16 billion. The actual cost fluctu-
ated depending on the market. For example, when Boeing and McDonnell Douglas first an-
nounced the merger, McDonnell Douglas was estimated to be worth $14 billion; seven months
later, McDonnell Douglas was estimated at a value of $16.3 billion. See Cole & Ricks, supra note
1, at A5 (reporting value of Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger).
12. SeeAlex Fryer, Europeans, Boeing May Have a Deal, SEATTLE TIMES, July 22, 1997, at Al
(reporting that U.S. Representative Jack Metcalf (R-Wash.) planned to introduce a resolution
in the U.S. House of Representatives condemning the EU investigation as an "unwarranted and
unprecedented interference in a United States business transaction"); Stephen H. Dunphy &
James V. Grimaldi, A Superpower in Aviation, and Now in Foreign Policy, SEATTLE TIMES, July 20,
1997, at F1 [hereinafter Dunphy & Grimaldi, A Superpower in Aviation] (reporting that U.S.
Senator Slade Gorton (R-Wash.) was "outraged" that the EU was asserting its antitrust authority
extraterritorially);James V. Grimaldi, EC Boeing Stand Worries Clinton, SEATTLE TIMES, July 17,
1997, at DI [hereinafter Grimaldi, EC Boeing Stand] (reporting on measure passed by U.S. Sen-
ate condemning the "imminent disapproval" of the merger). The contempt of U.S. lawmakers
toward the EU's scrutiny of the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger is curious considering that
the Commission's investigation of the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger is not the first time it
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were based purely on its protectionist interest in promoting Airbus,"
and warning EU authorities not to stand in the way of the merger."
The EU countered,' 5 stating that its investigation was conducted
strictly on the basis of European Community ("EC") law,16 and added
has used the Merger Regulation to examine a merger between two U.S. corporations. See, e.g.,
Commission Notification 33/05, 1996 OJ. (C 33) 7 (Chase Manhattan/Chemical Banking)
(investigating competitive effects of a merger between American banks Chase Manhattan and
Chemical Banking and concluding that the merger did not pose significant impediments to
competition); Commission Notification 95/03, 1995 OJ. (C 334) 3 (Seagate/Conner)
(investigating competitive effects of a merger between Seagate and Conner, both U.S. compa-
nies, and concluding the merger did not pose a significant impediment to competition). Fur-
thermore, U.S. antitrust authorities routinely examine anticompetitive behavior of non-U.S.
corporations. See, e.g., In re Mahle GmbH, Mahle, Inc., Metal Leve, S.A. and Metal Leve, Inc.,
FTC Docket No. C-3746 (June 4, 1997) (alleging that the acquisition of Metal Leve, Inc. by
Mahle, GmbH-a corporation organized, existing, and doing business under German law with
its principle place of business in Stuttgart, Germany-was in violation of U.S. antitrust laws, and
ordering Mahle, GmbH to divest Metal Leve, Inc.); In re Shell, Montedison, FTC Docket No. C-
3580 (May 25, 1995) (finding that merger between two leading polypropylene-making tech-
nologies, Montedison, S.PA, and Royal Dutch Shell Group, both Dutch corporations, was in
violation of U.S. antitrust laws, and ordering divestiture of Shell's polypropylene assets located
in the United States); see also FTC Comm'r Christine A. Varney, The Federal Trade Commission
and International Antitrust, Remarks Before the Fordham Corporate Law Institute 23rd Annual
Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy 12 (Oct. 17, 1996), available at
<http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/varney/fcli_96.htm> (discussing FTC's imposition of fines on
Mahle, GmbH for failing to notify the FTC, as mandated by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, prior to
its acquisition of Metal Leve, Inc.); FTC, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: ANTICIPATING THE
21sT CENTURY 7 (Spring 1997), available at <http://www.ftc.gov/reports/21cent/andc2l.htm>
(noting that Mahle, GmbH and Metal Leve, S.A. agreed to pay the highest civil penalty ever for
a Hart-Scott-Rodino Act violation-more than $5 million). These cases are not isolated exam-
ples of U.S./EU involvement in foreign mergers. The FTC noted that 25% of pre-merger noti-
fications under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act are from foreign firms. See The Federal Trade Commis-
sion and International Antitrust, supra, at 14. Furthermore, at least 24 mergers reviewed by the
EC between 1990 and 1995 involved situations in which both parties' headquarters were out-
side the EU. See EUROPEAN UNION LAW AFTER MAASrRICHT 449 (Ralph H. Folsom et al. eds.,
1996).
13. See Grimaldi, EC Boeing Stand, supra note 12, at D1 (expressing U.S. lawmakers belief
that EU concerns regarding Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger stemmed from its intentions
to protect Airbus).
14. See id. (reporting President Clinton's statement that it would be unfortunate if a trade
war resulted, but that the United States had"some options" should the EU attempt to block the
merger); Steven Pearlstein, Boeing Yields to Key EU Demand to Win Approval of McDonnell Deal,
WASH. POST, July 23, 1997, at D10 (reporting that President Clinton and U.S. officials threat-
ened retaliatory measures should the EU fall to approve the merger).
15. The EU responded to allegations that protectionism formed the basis for its objections
in Our Analysis of the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas File is Conducted Strictly on the Basis of the European
Merger Regulation, and Nothing Else, OFFICIAL PRESS RELEASE OF EUR. UNION IP/97/400 (Eur.
Comm'n, Brussels, BeIg.), May 13, 1997, at 1 [hereinafter Analysis of Boeing-McDonnell Douglas
File].
16. See generally EUROPEAN COMM'N DELEGATION TO THE U.S., THE EUROPEAN UNION: A
GUIDE 6-11 (1994) (explaining the structure of EU and role of EC law within EU). "EC law"
refers to the law governing the European Community (EC). The EC is a subpart of the EU.
The EU is comprised of three "pillars." The first pillar consists of the European Coal and Steel
Community ("ECSC") and the European Atomic Energy Community ("Euratom"). See TREATY
ON THE EUROPEAN UNION TOGETHER WITH THE COMPLETED TEXT OF THE TREATY ESTABLISHING
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Feb. 2, 1992, OJ. (C 224) [hereinafter EC TREATY]; TREATY
ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 167
[hereinafter ECSC TREATY]; TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY,
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that mergers in violation of EC law were subject to penalty. 17 United
States' criticism of the EU's stance escalated, 8 and the specter of a
Mar. 25, 1957,298 U.N.T.S. 167 [hereinafter Euratom Treaty]. See generally EUROPEAN COMM'N
DELEGATION TO THE U.S., THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE U.S. IN THE 1990's at 8 (1996)
(describing the three "pillars" that constitute the EU). The second and third pillar consist of
the Common Foreign and Security (CFSP) and Justice and Home Affairs, respectively. See EC
Treaty arts. J-K. Prior to 1993, the EC was called the European Economic Community (EEC)
and the EEC, ECSC and Euratom were collectively called the EC. See FOLSOM, supra note 7, at
8. In 1993, with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, the EC was joined by the second and third
pillars to form the EU. See FOLSOM, supra. The first pillar is the only one which imposes a body
of law binding on member states. This body of law is enforceable by the EU'sjudicial bodies,
the Court of First Instance (CFI) and the European Court of Justice (ECJ). See FOLsOM, supra
at 29, 34 (explaining that the CFSP and Justice and Home Affairs are not enforceable by the
ECJ and that the EC, ECSC, and Euratom Treaties form the primary source of law in the EU);
see JOHN PINDER, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: THE BUILDING OF A UNION 40 (2d ed. 1995)
(explaining EC law is binding on member states and enforceable by the CFI and ECJ). Because
only the rules governing the EC are legally binding, the only law within the EU is EC law. See
PINDER, supra, at 19 (stating that although it is becoming more common for all elements of the
EU to be referred to as the EU, it is inappropriate to use the term EU in relation to the EU's
legal system, which only applies to the European Communities). Thus, although the EU, spe-
cifically the European Commission, objected to the merger, it is EC law which governs the
merger.
17. See Fryer, supra note 12, at Al (reporting that the Commission could fine Boeing up to
10% of its combined sales-as much as $3.5 billion to $4 billion-should Boeing proceed with
the merger absent EU approval, and that the Commission could also fine companies that con-
tinued to do business with Boeing); see also infra note 107 (discussing Commission's ability to
impose fines). The EU's power to penalize the merger compelled Boeing to enter talks with
the EU and prompted both President Clinton and Congress to enter the discussion, urging
both sides to reach a compromise. See Cole et al., supra note 3, at A2 (reporting U.S. govern-
ment's "furious" lobbying of EU in regards to the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger); Dun-
phy & Grimaldi, A Superpower in Aviation, supra note 12, at F1 (analyzing Clinton Administra-
tion's involvement in the Boeing crisis); James V. Grimaldi, Europe Gives Boeing Deal Tentative
OK, SEATTLETIMES, July 23, 1997, at Al (reporting that Boeing had little choice but to negoti-
ate with the EU given the EU's power to impose fines); Pearlstein, supra note 11, at D10
(recounting Clinton administration's involvement in resolving Boeing crisis).
18. See A Dangerous' Merger?, WALL ST. J., July 21, 1997, at A22 (noting the shock of U.S.
lawmakers and businesses at the "audaciousness" of the EU's attempt to block the merger be-
tween two American companies). United States lawmakers rejected the EU's authority and ju-
risdiction to block the merger, maintaining that the EU had no right to "tell American compa-
nies how to do business," and questioned its motive, believing the EU's protests were merely a
means to protect and advance Airbus. See Christopher Carey, Europeans Ask Bloc for Boeing Rejec-
lion; Resistance Could Delay Deal ly Several Months, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, July 17, 1997, at Cl
(quoting U.S. Representative Jim Talent (D-Ohio), calling Commission's dismissal of FTC find-
ings "ludicrous"); A Dangerous'Merger?, supra, at A22 (arguing that the EU should not interfere
with "capitalist choices of consenting adults" and questioning whether the EU's reaction re-
sulted from its desire to protect its own aircraft manufacturing industry). The strong reaction
of U.S. lawmakers to EU "interference" with the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger is reminis-
cent of the EU's outrage at the extraterritorial application of the Helms-Burton Act. See Helms-
Burton and U.S. National Security, OFFICIAL PRESS RELEASE EUR. UNION IP/97/120 (Eur.
Comm'n, Brussels, Belg.), Feb. 12, 1997 (statement of Sir Leon Brittan) (criticizing the unac-
ceptable extraterritorial effects of the Helms-Burton Act). The issues surrounding the Helms-
Burton controversy and the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger, however, differ. The Helms-
Burton controversy was over the best means to achieve the mutual goal of fostering political
reform in Cuba. See id. (finding the Helms-Burton approach to promoting reform in Cuba un-
acceptable); Commission Reacts to U.S. on Cuba, OFFICIAL PRESS RELEASE EUR. UNION IP/96/650
(Eur. Comm'n, Brussels, BeIg.) July 16, 1996 (stating that although the EU shared the United
States' desire to reform Cuba, it rejected the U.S. approach). This controversy is in contrast to
the Boeing case, in which the EU and the United States not only shared the same overall goal
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trade war seemed inevitable.'9 In the end, however, crisis was averted:
Boeing agreed to several key concessions and the EU approved the
20
merger.
In the aftermath of the conflict, several questions remain. This
Comment focuses on the Commission's decision on the Boeing-
McDonnell Douglas merger and its consistency with past Commission
decisions and EC law. This Comment also considers the apparent fu-
tility of an agreement between the United States and EU, designed to
prevent antitrust conflicts, in reconciling the dispute over the Boe-
ing-McDonnell Douglas merger and suggests how antitrust authori-
ties on both sides of the Atlantic could work together to avoid a re-
peat of the Boeing case. Part I begins with an outline of the basic
premise and tenets of EC Competition Policy, specifically the EC
Merger Regulation. Part I also looks briefly at the FTC's approval of
the merger, as a source of comparison between the different ap-
proaches taken by the two antitrust authorities. Part II considers the
Commission's decision on the merger, detailing the reasons for its
decision. The EU's power to enforce its decision is discussed in Part
III. Part IV examines the consistency of the Commission's decision
on the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger with EC law and past
Commission decisions. Part V determines that the Commission's de-
cision was largely consistent with past decisions and EC law and sug-
gests that the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas controversy was a result of
divergent antitrust laws, rather than misapplication or political ma-
nipulation of those laws. Finally, Part VI concludes that current
of promoting competition, but followed the same means as well, investigation and application
of relevant antitrust laws, to achieve that goal. The controversy in the Boeing-McDonnell
Douglas merger stemmed from a difference of interpretation, namely what constituted a sig-
nificant impediment to competition. See supra Part I.B (discussing the FTC's view on the com-
petitive effects of the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Merger) and Part II (discussing the Commis-
sion's view on the competitive effects of the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger).
19. See Steven Pearlstein & Anne Swardson, U.S., Europe Clash Over Airline Dea4 BOSTON
GLOBE, July 17, 1997, at C2 (quoting U.S. Representative Norm Dicks (D-Wash.), who sug-
gested the United States and EU could be "heading for a major trade war" over Commission's
opposition to the merger); Grimaldi, EC Boeing Stand, supra note 12, at Dl (reporting concerns
of a looming trade war). Support of the EU's tough stance on the merger by its most powerful
member countries, suggest that had a "trade war" resulted, the political will to fight it would
have existed. French President Jacques Chirac, for instance, voiced his support for the Com-
mission's position and urged it to "stand firm" against the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas deal. See
id. German Economic Minister Gunter Rexrodt, as well as Belgian Prime Minister Jean-Luc
Dehaene, also publicly offered the Commission their support. See EU Commission Meets Again on
Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas Merger, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, July 17, 1997, available in Westlaw,
1997 WL 2154492.
20. See Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Decision, supra note 2, at 34-37 (detailing Boeing's
concessions); Steven Pearlstein, Europeans Relent, Back Boeing Merger, WASH. POST,July 24, 1997,
at El (reporting that Boeing Chairman Philip Condit conceded to concessions to secure EU
approval of the merger).
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mechanisms designed to avoid conflicts, specifically a U.S./EU
agreement on competition policy, are inadequate. This Comment
advocates that to prevent future Boeing-type crises, the United States
and the EU should forge more effective means of cooperating on
mergers affecting both jurisdictions. Such means would require the
two antitrust authorities not only to consult with each other, but to
coordinate and work together in both the investigative and deci-
sionmaking processes.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Merger Regulation
Like U.S. antitrust law, EC Competition Policy is a collection of dif-
ferent provisions, amended over time.21  The main tenets of EC
Competition Policy are contained in the founding treaties of the
European Community. 2 Excluding cases of state aid and dumping
21. The list of regulations governing competition law is extensive, but for the essential
laws, see EC TREATY arts. 85-94 (prohibiting anticompetitive behavior, including dumping,
abuse of a dominant position, restriction of trade, and distortion of the market through state
aid); Council Regulation 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the Control of Concentrations Be-
tween Undertakings, 1990 O.J. (L 257) 14 [hereinafter Regulation 4064/89) (prohibiting
mergers and certain types of joint ventures that create or strengthen a dominant position).
Article 85(1), prohibiting activities which may restrain trade between member states, and arti-
cle 86 prohibiting abuse of a dominant position, along with the Merger Regulation, form the
heart of EC antitrust law. SeeEC Treaty arts. 85(1), 86; Regulation 4064/89, supra. The regula-
tions detailing the block exemptions to Article 85 also are important. The regulations granting
block exemptions stem from Article 85(3), which permits activities in violation of 85(1) if the
activities are necessary to promote greater efficiencies or economic or technical progress, and
are beneficial to consumers. See Commission Regulation 556/89, 1989 O.J. (L 61) 1
(exempting certain categories of know-how licensing agreements); Commission Regulation
4087/88, 1988 O.J. (L 359) 46 (exempting certain types of franchising agreements);. Commis-
sion Regulation 417/85, 1985 O.J. (L 53) 1 (exempting certain types of specialization agree-
ments); Commission Regulation 418/85, 1985 OJ. (L 53) 15 (permitting exemption to catego-
ries of research and development agreements); Commission Regulation 123/85, 1985 (L 15)
16 (permitting exemption to categories of motor vehicle and servicing agreements); Commis-
sion Regulation 2349/84, 1984 OJ. (L 219) 15 (permitting certain categories of patent licens-
ing agreements); Commission Regulation 1984/83, 1983 OJ. (L 173) 5; Commission Regula-
tion 1983/83, 1983 O.J. (L 173) 1 (allowing limited types of exclusive distribution agreements).
See also the regulations amending the Merger Regulation: Council Regulation 1310/97, 1997
O.J. (L 180) 1 (amending various provisions of the merger regulation, in particular lowering
thresholds triggering application of the Merger Regulation) and Commission Regulation
2367/90, 1990 O.J. (L 219) 5 (making technical changes to the Merger Regulation). Regula-
tion 1310/97 took effect March 1, 1998 and therefore was not in effect at the time the Boeing
decision was rendered. SeeRegulation 1310/97, supra, at 6.
22. See EC TREATY arts. 85-94; ECSC TREATY arts. 65, 66(7). Euratom, the third founding
component of the European Community, contains no provisions on competition. See
EURATOM TREAT'. Although the ECSC and Euratom Treaties were intended to cover the coal
and steel and atomic energy sectors, respectively, the EC Treaty provisions governing competi-
tion apply to both the atomic energy sector and to those parts of the coal and steel sector fal-
ling outside the scope of the ECSC Treaty. See ROGER KOCH, SPICERS EUROPEAN UNION POLICY
BRIEFINGS: COMPETITION POLICY AND LAw 23-24 (1994) [hereinafter KOCH, EU POLICY
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covered by separate articles,23 Articles 85 and 86 of the EC treaty form
the backbone of EC Competition Law.24 Article 85 prohibits practices
that "have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or dis-
tortion of competition within the common market. "  Article 86 pro-
hibits the abuse of a dominant market position.6 Council Regulation
17 provides the mechanisms for enforcing Articles 85 and 86.27 Vari-
ous interpretation problems and clashes with the European Court of
Justice ("ECJ") revealed the inadequacy of the EC Treaty when ap-
plied to mergers and compelled the European Commission to de-
sign rules specially aimed at preserving competition when two or
more companies merged.Y The result was Council Regulation
4064/89 (the "Merger Regulation" or "Regulation"), which the
Council adopted in 1989.30
The Merger Regulation applies to all companies (called undertak-
ings in the EU) involved in a concentration3 1 that have a Community
dimension.2 The Regulation, however, does not limit its reach to EU
BRIEFINGS). The reach of the EC Treaty is the largest, handling matters not already covered by
the jurisdiction of the ECSC or the Euratom. See id. at 18 (noting that EC Competition Law
consists of a hierarchy of various provisions). See generally supra note 16.
23. See EC TREATY arts. 91-94.
24. See id. arts. 85-86.
25. Id. art. 85.
26. See id. art.86.
27. See Council Regulation 17/62, art. 15, 1962 O.J. (L 13) 87 (providing rules needed to
.secure uniform application of Articles 85 and 86 in the common market").
28. For an explanation of the role of the ECJ, see EUR. COMM'N, supra note 9, at 17-18.
29. See Regulation 4064/89, recital 6, supra note 21, at 14 (noting the difficulties in apply-
ing Articles 85 and 86 to concentrations); see also Timothy Dorsey, The European Community
Merger Regulation: Questions Answered Uncertainties Remain, 8 TUL. EUR. & Civ. L.F. 95, 97-100
(1993) (discussing the difficulties in applying Articles 85 and 86 to mergers).
30. See Regulation 4064/89, supra note 21, at 14.
31. See Regulation 4064/89, supra note 21, art. 3.1-3.2, at 17 (defining "concentration" to
include mergers as well as acquisitions and certain types of joint ventures); see also KOCH, EU
POLICYBRIEFINGS, supra note 22, at 186 (discussing definition of a concentration). Concentra-
tions of the joint venture variety are sometimes covered by Article 85 of the EC Treaty, depend-
ing on whether the joint venture is categorized as a cooperative or constrictive. See id. at 186-87
(discussing Commission's use of Article 85 and the Merger Regulation as they apply to joint
ventures).
32. See Regulation 1310/97, supra note 21 (detailing threshold criteria). Regulation
1310/97 provides that a concentration (i.e., merger) has a community dimension if it meets
four threshold criteria: (1) ECU 2.5 billion world-wide turnover; (2) ECU 100 million com-
bined aggregate turnover in at least three EU countries; (3) ECU 25 million turnover in each
of at least two of the companies in each of at least three countries included for the purpose of
(2); and (4) ECU 100 million aggregate EU-wide turnover of each of at least two of the compa-
nies. See id. at 2-3. Regulation 1310/97 amended Article 1 of Regulation 4064/89. The
amendment implemented by 1310/97 became effective March 1, 1998. See id. at 6. Prior to
March 1, 1998, Regulation 4064/89 outlined the threshold criteria providing that a concentra-
tion had a community dimension if it met two threshold criteria: (1) the aggregate worldwide
turnover of all the undertakings concerned totaled ECU 5 billion or greater; and (2) the ag-
gregate EU-wide turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings concerned totaled ECU
250 million. See Regulation 4064/89, supra note 21, art. 1, at 16. One ECU is equivalent to ap-
proximately $1.1. See Currency Exchange, WALL ST.J., Apr. 20, 1998, at C15. The threshold crite-
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companies" The Commission bases its assessment of whether a con-
centration has a community dimension on the activities and turn-
over 4 of the companies involved, regardless of whether the company
is incorporated, or even located within the EU."' If the companies
involved in a concentration meet the threshold criteria for turnover,
both overall and in the EU specifically, the Regulation authorizes the
Commission to act.%
If the Commission finds that the concentration has a Community
dimension, then the proposed merger is analyzed according to a
three-step process that: (1) defines the relevant product and geo-
graphic markets; (2) determines whether the company has a domi-
nant position, 7 and; (3) considers whether the dominant position
stands as a significant impediment to competitionss Under the sec-
ond and third steps, the Commission considers numerous factors, in-
cluding market share, correlation between market share and eco-
nomic power, barriers to entry, access to supply, the market position
of competitors, the need to preserve and develop competition, sup-
ply and demand trends, and the interests of the intermediate and ul-
timate consumers."
ria leave ample room for companies, having their principle fields of activities outside of the
EU, to nonetheless qualify as having a community dimension. In fact, the recital to the Merger
Regulation makes specific reference to this possibility. See Regulation 4064/89, recital 11, supra
note 21, at 14 (stating that the Regulation can apply in cases where the companies involved"do
not have their principal fields of activities in the Community but which have substantial opera-
tions there").
1 33. See, e.g., Chase Manhattan/Chemical Banking, supra note 12 (illustrating Commis-
sion's willingness to investigate non-EU corporations).
34. Turnover is roughly equivalent to the proceeds derived from sales less taxes. The
Merger Regulation contains a lengthy definition of turnover and how to calculate it in Article
5. See Regulation 4064/89, supra note 21, at 18; see also Regulation 1310/97, supra note 21, at 3
(amending Regulation 4064/89's turnover calculation methods).
35. See Towards an International Framework of Competition Rules: Communication from
the Commission to the Council, COM (96)284 final, reprinted in EUROPEAN COMM'N, IIIA
COMPETITION LAW IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: RULES IN THE INTERNATIONAL FIELD 433 n.1
(1997) [hereinafter International Framework] (noting that the Merger Regulation authorizes
the Commission to examine mergers of firms with headquarters outside the EU if threshold
requirements are met).
36. See Regulation 1310/97, supra note 21, at 2-3 (establishing criteria required to trigger
Merger Regulation).
37. See Commission Decision 91/299, 1991 Oj. (L 152) 21.40 (Soda-ash Decision)
(defining dominance as the "power to hinder effective competition," and accompanying ability
to exclude competitors from the market).
38. See Regulation 4064/89, art. 2.1, supra note 21, at 16 (stipulating the areas that the
Commission "shall" take into account when appraising a merger). See gene-ally EUROPEAN
COMM'N, XXIIIRD REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1993, at 173-85 (1994) [hereinafter REPORT
ON COMPETITION 1993] (discussing the appraisal of merger pursuant to the Merger Regula-
tion); Dorsey, supra note 29, at 95 (examining the rationale and substantive review criteria and
procedure used by the Commission in analyzing a merger); Ethan Schwartz, Politics as Usual:
The History of European Community Merger Contro4 18 YALE J. INT'L L. 607, 654-55 (1993)
(describing substantive evaluations of mergers under the Merger Regulation).
39. See Regulation 4064/89, art. 2.1(a)-(b),supra note 21, at 16 (stating that the Commis-
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The areas of examination under the Merger Regulation, however,
are not fixed. In the past, the Commission has emphasized some cri-
teria over others and even added or deleted criteria when appropri-
ate in a particular case. 0 If the proposed merger either strengthens
or creates a dominant position deemed either to impede competition
or create the possibility that the dominant company will abuse its po-
sition, the Commission has two options: (1) declare the merger in-
compatible with the EC law;41 or (2) negotiate modifications to the
proposed mergers so as to make it compatible with EC law. Should
the Commission choose the former, it has the authority to impose
substantial fines on companies who go through with the merger ab-
sion's assessment must consider "the need to maintain and develop effective competition" in
view of several factors, but providing no strict list of acceptable and unacceptable behavior);see
also Dorsey, supra note 29, at 107 (listing factors considered in Commission merger assess-
ments).
40. Regulation 4064/89 states that the Commission shall assess:
(a) the need to maintain and develop effective competition within the common mar-
ket in view of, among other things, the structure of all the markets concerned and the
actual or potential competition from undertakings located either within or outwith
the Community;
(b) the market position of the undertakings concerned and their economic and fi-
nancial power, the alternatives available to suppliers and users, their access to supplies
or markets, any legal or other barriers to entry, supply and demand trends for the
relevant goods and services, the interests of the intermediate and ultimate consumers,
and the development of technical and economic progress provided that it is to con-
sumers' advantage and does not form an obstacle to competition.
Regulation 4064/89, art. 2.1 (a)-(b), supra note 21, at 16.
The Commission has used the parameters set forth in the above article to develop concepts
such as collective dominance, which occurs when a small number of firms rather than a single
undertaking collectively controls a dominant part of the market. See EUROPEAN COMM'N, XXII
REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1992, at 23 (1993) (discussing Commission interpretation of
the Merger Regulation to "prevent the creation or strengthening not just of a dominant posi-
tion held by a single firm but also of a dominant position held jointly by a number of firms");
Recent Events in EU Merger Contro4 9 FIN. TIMES Bus. L. EuR. 3 (May 29, 1997) (reporting that
Commission will declare a merger incompatible with EC law when it finds an oligopoly of firms
occupying a dominant position-i.e., collective dominance); see also Commission Decision
97/26, 1997 O.J. (L 11) 30, 58-62 (Gencor/Lonrho) (finding the proposed merger incompati-
ble with EC law because the merger would lead to the creation of a duopoly-two companies
each controlling 35% of the market--dominating the world platinum market).
41. See Regulation 4064/89, art. 2.3, supra note 21, at 17 (stating that Commission shall
declare a concentration incompatible with the common market if it leads to the creation or
strengthening of a dominant position that significantly impedes competition). The term
"incompatible with the common market" simply means in violation of EC law. The EU's fun-
damental premise is to facilitate the common market (i.e., European integration). Therefore,
anything deemed to be incompatible with that goal is prohibited by law. See generaUy EC
TREATY art. 2 (stipulating that the Community's "task" is "to promote throughout the Commu-
nity a harmonious and balanced development of economic activities" through establishment of
the common market).
42. See Regulation 4064/89, art. 8.2, supra note 21, at 19 (providing the Commission may
declare a merger compatible with the common market or accept modification, eliminating an-
titrust concerns, and declare the merger compatible with EC law); Dorsey, supra note 29, at 106
(explaining options available to Commission upon finding that a concentration created or
strengthened a dominant position).
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sent EU approval.43 These fines can total 10% of the company's an-
nual revenue, which for a large company could run in the millions or
even billions."
Given the flexibility in the application of the Merger Regulation, it
is important to understand the premise on which the Regulation op-
erates.45 Like U.S. antitrust law, EU antitrust law operates on a policy
of promoting competition, which protects consumers from monopo-
listic abuse and fosters innovation and efficiency among competi-
tors.46 This, however, is not the only goal of EC Competition Policy.
47
Both the Treaty of Rome and the Merger Regulation contain provi-
sions emphasizing two other essential EU objectives: fostering Euro-
pean industry and propelling further integration of the European
market.48 Although the Commission has the legal authority to con-
sider these social and political objectives in its merger decisions, it
has not openly done so. Instead, the Commission's past decisions
adhere to the mostly objective criteria set forth in Part LA.4
B. FTC Approval of the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Merger
In accordance with U.S. antitrust law, Boeing reported its merger
plans with McDonnell Douglas to the FTC.s° After what it called an
"intensive and exhaustive investigation," the FTC concluded that the
43. See Regulation 4064/89, art. 14.2, supra note 21, at 22 (giving Commission authority to
collect fines from undertakings proceeding in the face of Commission disapproval); Regulation
17/62, art. 15(2), supra note 27, at 87 (authorizing Commission to collect fines from businesses
in violation of EC Competition law).
44. See Regulation 4064/89, art. 14.2, supra note 21, at 21 (stating that Commission may
impose fines not exceeding 10% of the aggregate turnover of the companies for violations of
Merger Regulation); see also Commission Decision 89/22, 1989 O.J. (L 10) 50, 72 (BPB Indus-
tries) (imposing fines totaling nearly ECU 3.2 million for violation of EC Law). One ECU is
equivalent to approximately $1.1. See Currency Exchange, supra note 32, at C15.
45. See KOCH, EU POLICY BRIEFINGS, supra note 22, at 18 (articulating importance of un-
derstanding EC Competition Law).
46. See Regulation 4064/89, art. 2.1(a)-(b), supra note 21, at 16 (stating that effective
competition and the interest of the consumer must be taken into account in merger apprais-
als); ANTICIPATING THE 21sT CENTURY, supra note 12 (noting that one of the FIC's basic mis-
sions is preventing anticompetitive practices with the goal of spurring efficiency and innova-
tion, and protecting the consumer).
47. See KOCH, EU POLICYBRIEFINGS, supra note 22, at 18-19 (stating that promoting compe-
tition is not the only goal of EC Competition Law).
48. See EC TREATY art. 3 (c), (k) (stating that EU activities shall include building an internal
market and strengthening competitiveness of European industry); Regulation 4064/89, recitals
2-4, 13, supra note 21, at 14-15 (stating that adopting Merger Regulation was consistent with
goal of increasing competitiveness of European industry, improving the conditions of growth,
raising the standard of living within the EU and furthering European integration).
49. This may be explained by a combination of the Commission's desire to avoid inter-
preting the vague language of the Merger Regulation's recital, and its belief that adherence to
more objective criteria enhances the legitimacy of EU authority.
50. See Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, tit. II, 15 U.S.C. §§ 18a(a),
(d) (1994) (requiring notification of mergers to the FTC and Department ofJustice).
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merger "would not substantially lessen competition or tend to create
a monopoly in either the defense or commercial aircraft markets."5'
The FTC rejected speculation that approval of the merger was based
on a desire to create a "national champion" in the world aircraft
market, 2 stating that the FTC lacked the "discretion to authorize an-
ticompetitive but 'good' mergers because they may be thought to ad-
vance the United States' trade interests."" Although the FTC recog-
nized Boeing's increased share of the large commercial aircraft
market from 60% to nearly 70%, as well as the substantial barriers
preventing potential competitors from entering the market, the FTC
concluded that the merger was not a violation of antitrust law.
4
The essential reasons for the FTC's decision were that McDonnell
Douglas no longer constituted a "meaningful competitive force in
the commercial aircraft market," and that nothing McDonnell Doug-
las could do, either alone or in concert with others, could alter its
position.55 Consequently, a merger between Boeing and McDonnell
Douglas could not be deemed anticompetitive, because McDonnell
Douglas, with its lack of competitive potential, offered Boeing little
or no competitive advantage in the civil aircraft market.6 The FTC
did express concern, however, about the twenty-year exclusive supply
contracts Boeing had concluded with three major airlines, stating
that it intended to monitor their "potential anticompetitive effects. 57
II. EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S DECISION ON THE BOEING-MCDONNELL
DOUGLAS MERGER
The Commission began its investigation into the Boeing-
McDonnell Douglas merger after Boeing notified the Commission on
51. In re Boeing Company/McDonnell Douglas Corp., supra note 6. But see In re Boeing
Company/McDonnell Douglas Corporation, FTC, file no. 971-0051 (July 1, 1997) (statement of
Commissioner Mary L. Azcuenaga) (arguing in dissent that the merger "created a classic case
for challenge" under U.S. merger guidelines, and finding reason to believe the merger in viola-
tion of Section 7 of the Clayton Act).
52. See Carey, supra note 18, at C1 (reporting accusations by Airbus that U.S. antitrust
authorities collaborated in a deliberate strategy to eliminate Airbus from the commercial air-
craft market).
53. In reBoeing Company/McDonnell Douglas Corp., supra note 6, at 1-2.
54. See id. (basing decision on McDonnell Douglas' lack of commercial viability and un-
likelihood that merger would influence market for military aircraft).
55. See id. at 3 (detailing reason for McDonnell Douglas' poor commercial position).
56. See id. at 3-5. Given this assessment, Boeing's only reason for investing $14 billion dol-
lars to acquire McDonnell Douglas would be for the advantages offered by McDonnell Doug.
las' defense division. The EU's assessment of McDonnell Douglas' commercial position, how-
ever, was significantly different. See Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Decision, supra note 2, at 24-
28. The EU argued that McDonnell Douglas' commercial aircraft production capacity would
bolster Boeing's commercial aircraft business by boosting capacity, improving technology, and
adding skilled workers to its manufacturing assets. See id.
57. See In reBoeing Company/McDonnell Douglas Corp., supra note 6, at 5.
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February 18, 19 9 7 .' On March 19th, the Commission announced it
had decided to proceed with an in-depth investigation of the merger
and would reach a final decision within four months.59 Two months
later the Commission notified Boeing of its objection to the merger,
and negotiations between Boeing and the Commission commenced.o
The Commission announced its final decision on July 30, 1997.6
When the Commission announced its decision on the Boeing-
McDonnell Douglas merger, it stated that it based its decision on the
Merger Regulation and "in accordance with its own past practice and
the jurisprudence of the European Court [of Justice]., 62  Although
Commission officials may have considered political or social con-
cerns while investigating the merger, these concerns did not find of-
ficial expression in the Commission's decision.ss Like the FTC, the
EU stated that it molded its decision around the objective criteria of
its own antitrust laws.6'
The Commission centered its analysis on the Merger Regulation. 65
Defining the product and geographic market of the merging compa-
58. SeeBoeing-McDonnell Douglas Decision, supra note 2, at 16-17.
59. See Commission Begins Investigation, supra note 8, at 1 (announcing Commission's con-
cern about potential anticompetitive effects of Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger and its in-
tention to investigate the merger). A Commission inquiry into a proposed merger proceeds in
two phases. See Regulation 4069/89, supra note 21, arts. 6, 8, at 19. Each merger meeting the
threshold criteria must pass a phase one, or Article 6, inquiry. If, after this inquiry, the Com-
mission finds that merger raises serious doubts as to its compatibility with competition law, the
Commission will instigate a phase two, or in-depth, investigation of the merger pursuant to Ar-
ticle 8 of the Merger Regulation. See id. (stipulating necessary assessments to be made when
investigating mergers). The Commission is obligated to complete a phase one inquiry within
one month and a phase two inquiry within four months. Seeid. at 20-21.
60. See Cool Heads Needed in Brussels and Washington, 9 FIN. TImES Bus. L. EUR. 16, May 29,
1997 (stating that Commission notified Boeing and McDonnell Douglas of its antitrust con-
cerns and that two months remained to reach a solution).
61. See The Commission Clears the Merger Between Boeing and McDonnell Douglas Under Condi-
tions and Obligation, OFFiCIAL PRESS RELEASE OFTHEEUR. UNION IP/7/729 (EUR. COMM'N, Brus-
sels, Belg.),July 30, 1997 [hereinafter Commission Clears Merger].
62. Id. (stating that its "rigorous analysis" of the merger was "in accordance with its own
practice and the jurisprudence of the European Court"); see also Analysis of Boeing-McDonnell
Douglas Rle, supra note 15 (quoting Karel Van Miert, European Commissioner in charge of
Competition Policy, who stated, "[O]ur analysis of this case is strictly conducted along the lines
and criteria which have been spelled out in the legal framework of the merger Regulation [sic],
and nothing else").
63. See Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Decision, supra note 2 (containing no explicit refer-
ences to social or political concerns as factors in Commission's decision on the merger).
64. See id. at 16 (detailing regulations and laws applicable to its decision); Commission Clears
Merger, supra note 61, at I (stating that Commission reached its conclusion on the basis of
European Merger Regulations and past decisions). But see A Dangerous'Merger?, supra note 18,
at A22 (arguing that EU's method of gaining concessions from Boeing resembled bullying and
showed little regard for the rule of law).
65. See Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Decision, supra note 2, at 16 (using Merger Regulation
to assess compatibility of proposed merger with EC law); Commission Clears Merger, supra note
61, at 1 (stating that Commission's analysis was based on Merger Regulation and EU prece-
dent).
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nies, unlike many merger regulation cases, appeared to provide the
Commission with little trouble.6 The Commission defined the prod-
uct market as that for "large commercial jet aircraft., 67 The Commis-
sion, acknowledging U.S. trade officials' concern about EU interfer-
ence with the U.S. defense industry, refrained from analyzing the
merger as it affected the market for defense.6 The definition of the
relevant geographic market proved even less difficult. Given the
global need for commercial planes, the Commission concluded that
the relevant geographic market was clearly the world.6
The Commission next considered whether Boeing occupied a
dominant position in the commercial aircraft market.7 ° Boeing, the
number one producer among only three manufacturers of civilian
commercial jets, already occupied a dominant position.7 1 The Com-
mission cited the fact that Boeing's pre-merger market share for
large commercial jets totaled 64% worldwide and that Boeing planes
accounted for 60% of the planes in service.7 In addition, the Com-
mission pointed out that Boeing was the only manufacturer who of-
fered a 400-plus seat aircraft, as well as a "complete family of air-
craft.
'' 3
Further, the Commission ruled out the possibility that another
competitor would enter the market and pose a viable source of com-
petition.4 Like the FTC,75 the Commission concluded that the
enormous capital costs involved in commercial jet manufacturing
erected barriers too high for any possible new entrant to surmount.
76
66. See Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Decision, supra note 2, at 18-19 (discussing relevant
product and geographic markets).
67. See id. at 17-18. The Commission found two separate relevant product markets, the
market for wide-body jets and the market for narrow-body jets, within the overall market for
large commercialjets. Seeid.
68. See id. at 17-18.
69. See id. at 19 ("[T]he Commission considers that the geographic market for large com-
mercialjet aircraft to be taken into account is a world market.").
70. See id. at 19-21 (assessing Boeing's dominant position in the commercial aircraft mar-
ket).
71. See id. at 14 (identifying Boeing as the leading manufacturer of large commercial air-
craft).
72. See id. at 22 (providing worldwide in-service fleet percentages for Boeing, McDonnell
Douglas and Airbus); see also Case C-62/86, Akzo Chemie B.V. v. Commission, (1991] 1/7 E.C.R.
3359, [19931 3 C.M.L.R. 215 (holding that when a firm controls more than 50% of the market
share, it is presumed, absent "exceptional circumstances," that it occupies a position of domi-
nance).
73. See Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Decision, supra note 2, at 21-22 (describing purchasers'
desire to select a single supplier offering several aircraft models).
74. See id. at 24 (basing unlikelihood of new competitors on onerous entry costs and tech-
nical production methods).
75. See In re Boeing Company/McDonnell Douglas Corp., supra note 6, at 2
(characterizing barriers to entry in commercial large jet market as "extremely high").
76. See Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Decision, supra note 2, at 24 (discussing improbability
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Boeing would remain secure in its position of dominance, with or
without the merger.
7
The most difficult question for the Commission contemplating the
Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger, however, rested in the third step
of the Merger Regulation's analysis: whether the acquisition of
McDonnell Douglas would significantly strengthen Boeing's domi-
nant position.78 Boeing's acquisition of McDonnell Douglas would
increase its worldwide market share to 70% and give Boeing a mo-
nopoly on the smallest narrow-body passenger jets (the 737 and MD-
95). This would be in addition to its already existing monopoly on
the largest wide-body passenger jet (the 747) .7 Unlike the FTC,80
however, the Commission did not dismiss the competitive potential
of McDonnell Douglas."' Although the Commission recognized the
deterioration of McDonnell Douglas' sales in recent years, the de-
cline in customer confidence, and the company's shrinking invest-
ment in research and development, the Commission maintained that
Boeing would benefit from the remaining competitive potential of
McDonnell Douglas in the commercial aircraft industry.8 2
The Commission further explored the increase in customer base
that Boeing would reap as a result of the merger.3 The acquisition of
McDonnell Douglas would increase Boeing's customer base from
60% to 84% of the current worldwide fleet in service.84 The Commis-
sion viewed such a large customer base as a competitive advantage in
Boeing's favor.85 Not only would Boeing be in a superior position to
of new market entrants).
77. See id. at 24, 36 (concluding that merger reinforced Boeing's dominant position and
that no new entrants to the aircraft market were likely to enter and challenge that position).
78. See id. at 24-36 (exploring nature and reasons for Boeing's dominance and the rein-
forcement of that dominance through its acquisition of McDonnell Douglas).
79. See id. at 24-25.
80. See lureThe Boeing Company/McDonnell Douglas Corp., supra note 6, at 2 (holding
that the merger did not present an antitrust violation because McDonnell Douglas no longer
constituted a competitive force in civil aircraft market).
81. See Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Decision, supra note 2, at 25-26 (finding that although
McDonnell Douglas ceased to be a real force in the market on a "stand-alone basis," its com-
petitive potential could be a significant factor in the market when merged with Boeing).
82. See id. at 24 (positing that remaining competitive potential of McDonnell Douglas
would improve Boeing's position in civil aircraft market). The Commission emphasized that
alone McDonnell Douglas did not represent a competitive force, but that in concert with Boe-
ing the competitive potential of McDonnell Douglas' commercial division would improve sig-
nificantly. See id. at 26. The commercial division of McDonnell Douglas is called Douglas Air-
craft Company, but for the purposes of this Comment, McDonnell Douglas Corporation is
referred to as a whole, recognizing that consideration of the defense division of McDonnell
Douglas was not touched by the Commission.
83. See id. at 26-27.
84. See id.
85. See id. (stating that a vital element in strengthening Boeing's dominance would be its
post-merger increase in customer base).
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induce current purchasers of McDonnell Douglas planes to buy Boe-
ing planes in the future,6 but, given the range and size of its fleet,
Boeing would be better equipped to offer loyal customers preferen-
tial access to its planes and services. Further, the exclusive supply
arrangements Boeing had already crafted with American, Delta and
Continental, the first, third and fourth largest operators of McDon-
nell Douglas aircraft respectively, stood as testimony to this type of
marketing advantage.& The Commission predicted that use of these
exclusive supply arrangements would rise, which would increasingly
prevent other manufacturers from competing for a large number of
commercial aircraft contracts.8 9
Of final concern to the Commission was the link between McDon-
nell Douglas' civil and defense divisions. The Commission, pursuant
to the request of the U.S. government, declined to investigate the po-
tentially anticompetitive consequences involved in Boeing's acquisi-
tion of McDonnell Douglas' defense division. It did, however, look at
the effect that McDonnell Douglas' military capacity would have on
Boeing's civil aircraft division 0 The Commission's primary concern
was that Boeing's acquisition of McDonnell Douglas' defense division
would enhance its access to publicly funded research and develop-
ment.' Essentially, the Commission feared that government aid in-
tended for defense purposes would create a spillover effect, whereby
knowledge and expertise intended for military purposes and sup-
ported by publicly funded defense grants would penetrate Boeing's
civil division.92 The spillover would indirectly give Boeing a competi-
tive advantage in research and development for its commercial jets.9'
The Commission also voiced reservation about the acquisition of
McDonnell Douglas' defense division in regard to third party suppli-
86. See id. (concluding that the close ties McDonnell Douglas has with its customers would
be transferred to Boeing upon its acquisition).
87. See id. at 22-23, 26 (stating that Boeing's close ties with McDonnell Douglas' commer-
cial customers would give Boeing the opportunity to better influence and identify customer
needs).
88. See id. at 27-28 (maintaining that Boeing has used its leverage with customers to ac-
quire exclusive supply deals).
89. See id. at 23, 27-28 (concluding that Boeing could use influence acquired from its in-
creased customer base to induce future exclusive supply arrangements and further exclude
potential competitors). The Commission believed Boeing's exclusive supply arrangements
with American, Delta, and Continental could foreclose competitors from 40% of the worldwide
market for large commercial jets. See id. at 28.
90. See id at 28 (concluding that Boeing's acquisition of McDonnell Douglas' defense divi-
sion would significantly strengthen its dominant position in civil aircraft market).
91. See id. at 30-35.
92. See i& at 32-36.
93. See id at 35 (finding that Boeing's access to technology of McDonnell Douglas' defense
division would further strengthen Boeing's commercial market dominance).
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ers. 4 Given that McDonnell Douglas was the leading manufacturer
of military aircraft, the Commission feared that Boeing's acquisition
of McDonnell Douglas would give Boeing greater bargaining power
with suppliers who may have contributed parts to both McDonnell
Douglas' civil and defense aircraft. 5
The Commission, examining these above concerns, concluded that
the acquisition of McDonnell Douglas would indeed strengthen Boe-
ing's existing dominant position.9 Unchanged, the Commission
contended, the merger would violate the Merger Regulation and EC
Competition Law."7
In an effort to change the Commission's position, Boeing accepted
three key concessions: (1) cessation of existing and future supply
deals; (2) "ring-fencing" of McDonnell Douglas' commercial division
for a period of ten years;"8 and (3) licensing of nonexclusive patents
and "underlying know-how" generated through publicly funded re-
search and development to other jet aircraft manufacturers.9 In ad-
dition, Boeing agreed not to abuse its relationship with customers
and suppliers to gain an unfair competitive advantage, and to report
to the Commission annually regarding any military and civil research
and development projects benefiting from public funding.'00
Cessation of the exclusive supply arrangements, the ring-fencing of
McDonnell Douglas' commercial division, and the commitment not
to abuse its relationship with customers was intended to remedy the
"anticompetitive" advantage Boeing stood to gain by the enlargement
of its market share and customer base.'0' Boeing sought to remedy
the spillover effect from McDonnell Douglas' defense division
through licensing of nonexclusive patents and know-how. Boeing's
commitment to supply the Commission with annual reports on proj-
ects benefiting from public funding and to refrain from linking de-
94. See id. at 35-36.
95. See id. at 35.
96. See id. at 36.
97. See id (finding that proposed merger incompatible with the common market absent
changes).
98. See id. (detailing Boeing's commitment to maintain commercial division of McDonnell
Douglas as separate legal entity for ten years); see also Commission Clears Merger, supra note 61
(using "ring fencing" to describe Boeing's commitment to maintain McDonnell Douglas'
commercial division as separate legal entity).
99. See id at 36-38.
100. See id at 37-38.
101. See id at 38-39 (discussing Boeing remedies). The Commission noted that the tradi-
tional option of divestment was an impossibility with McDonnell Douglas. See id. at 38. No
other existing aircraft manufacturer expressed interest in acquiring McDonnell Douglas, nor
would it be possible (given the capital-intensive nature ofjet aircraft manufacturing) to find a
potential new entrant to the commercial jet market who might be interested in purchasing
McDonnell Douglas. See id.
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fense aircraft and commercial aircraft supply contracts was also de-
signed to remedy the spillover effect.1 2 The Commission considered
such measures adequate to remedy the major anticompetitive prob-
lems stemming from the merger, and declared the merger compati-
ble with EC law.
03
III. EU POWER TO OPPOSE THE MERGER
Had the Commission and Boeing been unable to reconcile their
differences, the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger would have been
declared incompatible with EC Competition Law. 1 4 If Boeing had
proceeded with the merger absent EU approval, the Merger Regula-
tion would have empowered the Commission to fine the merged
Boeing-McDonnell Douglas ten percent of its annual revenue.' For
a company the size of Boeing-McDonnell Douglas, that fine would
have amounted to nearly five billion dollars.16
In addition, the possibility existed for the Commission to levy a
fine equaling ten percent of annual revenue against any EU company
that continued to do business with Boeing. 0 7 This latter fine would
102. See i& at 38-39.
103. See id at 39 (finding that Boeing's concessions addressed the competition problems
the Commission identified).
104. See id (stating that the Commission's approval was contingent on Boeing complying
with its concessions).
105. See Regulation 4064/89, art. 14, supra note 21, at 22 (authorizing the Commission to
"impose fines not exceeding 10% of the aggregate turnover" of the companies involved in con-
centrations proceeding despite a Commission finding of incompatibility with the common
market); Commission Clears Merger, supra note 61 (stating that Merger Regulation allows for
.appropriate measures to be taken by the Commission in the event of non-compliance").
106. Compare Cole & Ricks, supra note 1, at A5 (reporting that Boeing's estimated annual
turnover is approximately $48 billion), with Fryer, supra note 12 (reporting that the EU could
levy fines amounting to 10% of a company's annual turnover). Thus, Boeing's fine would
amount to 10% of $48 billion, or $4.8 billion. But see CHRISTOPHER HARDING, EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY INVESTIGATIONS AND SANCTIONS 88-90 (1993) (explaining that percent of turnover
calculations for fines may not be as simple as taking 10% of world-wide turnover).
107. See Fryer, supra note 12, at Al (reporting that the Commission could fine Boeing as
well as corporations doing business with Boeing, if Boeing proceeded with a merger deemed
incompatible with EC law). Regulation 17/62 is the general sanctions provision for breaches of
EC Competition Policy. See Regulation 17/62, supra note 27; EUROPEAN UNION LAW AFrER
MAAsTRIcHT, supra note 12, at 348. Regulation 17/62, Article 15(2) allows the Commission to
levy fines, according to the gravity and duration of the offense, on companies who deliberately
and knowingly violate EC Competition Law. See HARDING, supra note 106, at 81-82. Although
not explicitly stated in Regulation 17/62, conducting business with a company deemed to be
operating in violation of EC Competition Law would appear to violate the general principle of
Article 85. Article 85 prohibits all "agreements between undertakings which have as their ob-
ject or effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition within the [EU]." See EC
TREATY art. 85. If the Commission has deemed the concentration to significantly impede com-
petition, it is not a stretch to assume that any deliberate third party action in support of that
concentration, would also be deemed to impede competition and hence, constitute an Article
85 violation subject to the fines set forth in Regulation 17/62. See Regulation 17/62, supra note
27.
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have eliminated Boeing's competitive advantage in the European
market and precluded Boeing from effectively rivaling Airbus within
the jurisdiction of the EU'
Although the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger avoided such
sanctions, it is important to recognize that the EU significantly al-
tered the shape of the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger. In mak-
ing several concessions, Boeing directly submitted itself to the EU's
regulatory authority, and will continue to remain subject to that
authority as the EU monitors Boeing for compliance with the condi-
tions of the merger.'09 Nearly $5 billion in fines and the possible
foreclosure of the European market await Boeing should it fail to do
110SO.
IV. CONSISTENCY OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION
Consistency of the Commission's Boeing-McDonnell Douglas deci-
sion with past Commission decisions is not a requirement of the
Commission's adjudicative process. The Commission is merely
bound to judge a given merger in accordance with the Merger Regu-
lation. Consistency of decisions, however, is crucial to both the le-
gitimacy of Commission decisions, particularly in the eyes of a skepti-
cal American public, and the ability of businesses and their attorneys
to structure mergers in compliance with EC law. The following
analysis examines the three central concerns of the EU regarding the
Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger for consistency with past deci-
sions and EC law: (1) the 20-year exclusive supply contracts with
three top air carriers; (2) the spillover effects of McDonnell Douglas'
publicly funded defense division; and (3) the expansion of Boeing's
market share."' An examination of the remedies the EU demanded
108. See Fauziah Ismail, Airbus Chief Pierson Slams Boeing-McDonnell Merger, Bus. TIMES, July
17, 1997, at 1 (stating that fines on EU companies could essentially prohibit the enlarged Boe-
ing from operating in Europe). The loss of the European market would be a tremendous blow
to Boeing. The EU estimates that the European market for planes will be between 2000 and
2100 orders over the next ten years-just slightly smaller than the U.S. market, which U.S.
authorities estimate will need between 2000 and 2500 new planes over the same time period.
See EU Panel Rejects $15 Billion Boeing/McDonnell Dea BOSTON GLOBE, July 17, 1997, at C2
(reporting the number of new planes the U.S. and European markets will require).
109. See Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Decision, supra note 2, at 36-38 (taking note of the
concessions Boeing agreed to in order to obtain EU consent to the merger); Commission Clears
Merger, supra note 61 (announcing the EU's intention to "strictly monitor" Boeing regarding its
compliance with agreed upon concessions).
110. See Regulation 4064/89, art. 14, supra note 21, at 22 (articulating the 10% of annual
revenue fine that the Commission is authorized to levy in the event of non-compliance); see also
Cole & Ricks, supra note 1, at A5 (noting that the annual revenue of Boeing is approximately
$48 billion).
111. See Commission Clears Merger, supra note 61 (listing these as the commission's central
concerns).
1998] 1047
1048 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY lAw REVIEW [Vol. 47:1029
for approval of merger follows. These examinations reveal that the
Commission's initial concern and final decision on the Boeing
merger are generally, but not entirely, consistent with past Commis-
sion decisions and EC law.
A. Exclusive Supply Arrangements
Exclusive supply arrangements of the type contracted between
Boeing and Delta, Continental, and American Airlines, have been
consistently held to violate EC Competition Law."2  Neither the
Merger Regulation nor any other specific EC Competition regulation
outlaws these arrangements."' Rather, the Commission has repeat-
edly interpreted Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty to hold such ar-
rangements a violation of EC law." 4 According to the Commission,
112. See CAMERON MuRKBY HEwITr, BUSINEss GUIDE TO COMPETITION LAw 16 (1995)
(stating that exclusive supply arrangements are generally considered a violation of EC Compe-
tition Policy). These agreements fall under the provisions of Article 85(1) of the EC Treaty,
prohibiting practices which restrict trade between member states. See EC TREATY art. 85(1); see
also supra Part L.A (discussing the goals of EC Competition Policy as contained in the EC
Treaty). The Commission, however, has exempted certain types of exclusive purchasing ar-
rangements from the provisions of Article 85. See Commission Regulation 1984/83, supra note
21, at 5-7 (stating that Article 85(1) shall not apply to certain agreements). Regulation 1984/83
only applies, however, to purchasing agreements whereby one party agrees to purchase goods
for resale exclusively from the other party. See id. at 26. Agreements longer than five years in
duration and covering a broad range of goods are not privy to the exemption. See Regulation
1984/83, arts. 2.1 (a)-3(d), supra note 21, at 8. Article 85(3) may also exempt a particular ex-
clusive supply arrangement. These exemptions do not mean that the agreement is not bound
by Article 85(1), but rather that it is exempt because, although it restricts competition, it im-
proves production or distribution without eliminating competition. See EC TREATY art. 85(3)
(permitting certain practices that may restrict competition if they are "indispensable" to im-
provements in "the production or distribution of goods or... [the promotion of] technical or
economic progress" and can be implemented while allowing consumers a fair share of the re-
sulting benefits and without eliminating competition); see also HEwrrr, supra, at 23 (explaining
the exemption provided by Article 85(3)).
113. See Regulation 4064/89, recital 25, supra note 21, at 16 (stating that the Merger Regu-
lation allows exclusive supply arrangements on a limited basis, namely in circumstances when
"the undertakings concerned accept restrictions directly related and necessary to the imple-
mentation of the concentration"). The Commission has clarified this provision in its Ancillary
Restraints Notice, which allows exclusive supply arrangements of a limited duration if such an
arrangement is necessary in order to minimize disruption of procurement and supply within an
integrated seller. See BARRY E. HAWK & HENRY L. HUSER, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY MERGER
CONTROL: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 272, 282-83 (1996) (discussing the Ancillary Restraints No-
tice).
114. See Commission Decision 93/406, 1993 O.J. (L 183) 19, 30-37 (Langnese-Iglo Deci-
sion) (finding that a two-year renewable exclusive supply agreement between a buyer and seller
was incompatible with EC law because the market was shared by only two main competitors,
because high barriers to entry existed, and because the agreements provided no social or eco-
nomic advantage to consumers); Commission Decision 91/299, supra note 37, at 30-38
(holding an agreement, which offered a seller's major customers loyalty rebates and discounts
and obligated buyers to fulfill their entire supply requirements exclusively from the seller an
abuse of a dominant position in violation of Article 86); Commission Decision 89/22, supra
note 44, at 65-67, 72 (holding that an exclusive supply agreement in the form of promotional
payments to loyal customers constituted a violation of EC law); Commission Decision 79/934,
1979 OJ. (L 286) 32 (BP Kemi/DDSF Decision) (holding that a six-year exclusive supply ar-
19981 BOEING-MCDONNELL DOUGLAS MERGER 1049
exclusive supply agreements prevent other suppliers from competing
for the purchaser's business," 5 and thus constitute a restriction on
competition.' 6 The mere existence of an exclusive supply contract,
however, is not a per se violation. But, when such a contract covers a
range of products over a lengthy period of time17 and the contract is
implemented in an already weak competitive context (e.g., dominant
market participant and high barriers to entry)," 8 the Commission has
not hesitated to hold that such arrangements are incompatible with
EC law. '9
Considering the EU's prior decisions, the Commission's refusal to
approve the merger without cancellation of Boeing's exclusive supply
rangement in which buyer agreed to purchase up to 25,000 tons of its ethanol requirements
from the seller was incompatible with EC law, despite the fact that the buyer could fulfill its re-
quirements exceeding 25,000 tons with ethanol from other suppliers, and that either party
could terminate the agreement upon twelve months notice); cf. Commission Decision 84/44,
1984 OJ. (L 19) 17 (Grohe's Distribution System Decision) (holding that a selective supply
agreement, prohibiting a seller from reselling the supplier's plumbing fittings to any party,
other than a specific plumbing contractor, was a violation of EC law). But see Commission De-
cision 84/387, 1984 O.J. (L 212) 1, 7-12 (BPCL/ICI Decision) (finding that a five-year mutually
exclusive supply contract was compatible with EC law, despite its object and effect of restricting
competition, because it met the criteria of an Article 85(3) exemption, specifically that the ar-
rangements sought to return a market functioning at over-capacity to equilibrium, made pro-
duction more efficient and increased the supply available to consumers); Commission Decision
78/194, 1978 OJ. (L 61) 17 (Jaz-Peter Decision) (finding that a six-month, renewable, mutually
exclusive supply contract was compatible with EC law despite its restriction on competition be-
cause it met the criteria for an Article 85(3) exemption: the arrangement would benefit con-
sumers by improving distribution and quality and could not be used to quash competition due
to the existence of other competitors in the contracting parties' market).
115. See Commission Decision 93/406, supra note 114, at 26 (stating the exclusive supply
agreements prevent other suppliers from competing); Commission Decision 79/934, supra
note 114, at 59-60 (stating that exclusive supply agreements prevent others from competing,
resulting in a restriction of competition and a violation of Article 85). The Commission in
Langnese also noted that when two leading suppliers dominate a market (a duopolistic mar-
ket), such suppliers compete for the conclusion of exclusive agreements, with the effect of ex-
cluding "competition of any other kind for the duration of the agreement." Commission Deci-
sion 93/406, supra note 114, at 33, 36.
116. See Commission Decision 93/406, supra note 114, at 30 (finding that exclusive supply
agreements involving goods which comprise more than fifteen percent of the relevant market
have an appreciable effect on competition); Commission Decision 79/934, supra note 114, at
38, 40 (finding that an obligation to buy ethanol exclusively from BP Kemi would give Kemi BP
a decisive competitive advantage in the ethanol market and distort competition).
117. See Commission Decision 79/934, supra note 114, at 41 (stating that the longer an ex-
clusive supply contract lasts, the more competition is impeded).
118. See Commission Decision 93/406, supra note 114, at 32 (holding that when a company
already occupying a dominant position, concludes exclusive supply contracts, it leads to less
competition); Commission Decision 89/22, supra note 44, at 72 (holding that an exclusive sup-
ply arrangement concluded by a dominant competitor is a violation of EC law); Commission
Decision 79/934, supra note 114, at 42 ("When on such a market, which already displays a weak
competitive structure, one of the most important suppliers enters into long-term contracts with
one of the most important purchasers, which then induce the purchaser to take all his re-
quirements or the major part of his requirements from the same supplier, there exists an ap-
preciable disadvantage for the supplier's competitors ... and there is thus a restriction of com-
petition.").
119. SeeCommission Decision 79/934, supra note 114, at 40-42.
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agreements with the three airlines is warranted. First, the exclusive
supply contracts between Boeing and the air carriers were for a pe-
121riod of twenty years, substantially longer than necessary to trigger a
violation of EC law.'21 Second, Boeing's exclusive supply contracts
with the airlines were for a range of products (i.e., large commercial
jets of various sizes and dimensions), an element that the Commis-
sion considers as impermissibly restricting competition.122 Further-
more, the exclusive supply agreements, would have existed in a weak
competitive market of only two competitors possessing approximately
70% and 30% of the market-another crucial factor in past Commis-
sion decisions on the incompatibility of an exclusive supply agree-
ment with EC law.123
Thus even absent the possibility of a proliferation of exclusive sup-
ply arrangements between Boeing and other air carriers, 4 the
Commission would be hard-pressed to approve the proposed merger,
for doing so would give approval to a concentration clearly operating
in violation of a well explored and accepted tenet of EC law. 
1
2
B. Spillover Effects of McDonnell Douglas' Defense Division
Although EC law and past Commission decisions support the
Commission's investigation and conclusion on the exclusive supply
contracts, the Commission's consideration of the spillover effects of
governmental aid to the defense arm of a company are unprece-
dented.2 6 A survey of the phase two (i.e., in-depth or Article 8) inves-
tigations from 1993-1996 reveals that the Commission has not once
considered the affects of the potential spillover of state aid in the
context of an investigation pursuant to the Merger Regulation.'
120. See Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Decision, supra note 2, at 23.
121. See Commission Decision 79/934, supra note 114, at 42 (holding that a six-year agree-
ment "certainly goes beyond what is appropriate under EEC rules of competition"); see also
Commission Regulation 1984/83, supra note 21, at 8 (limiting the Regulation's exemption of
certain exclusive supply agreements to those less than five years in duration).
122. See Commission Decision 93/406, supra note 114, at 30-31 (finding an exclusive supply
agreement impermissibly restrict competition in violation of Article 85, unless the company
could show the agreement was for a limited duration and for certain specified goods).
123. See supra note 118 (citing cases where exclusive agreements, concluded in a weak
competitive market, were found to violate EC law).
124. See Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Decision, supra note 2, at 28 (finding that the merger
would enhance Boeing's ability to conclude additional exclusive supply deals).
125. See supra notes 112-19, 121-22 and accompanying text (examining under what circum-
stances the Commission has rejected exclusive supply agreements).
126. See Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Decision, supra note 2, at 39 (noting that the spillover
effects of the defense side of McDonnell Douglas were difficult to address fully in the context
of the Boeing investigation under the Merger Regulation).
127. See EUROPEAN COMM'N, XXVITH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1996, at 61-66, 171-
89 (1997) [hereinafter REPORT ON COMPETITION 1996] (summarizing the year's Commission
decisions but including no cases dealing with the spillover effects of state aid); EUROPEAN
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This is not to conclude that the Commission lacks the authority to
consider state aid in a merger decision, but simply that there is no
precedent for the Commission having done so in the Boeing-
McDonnell Douglas case.
It is foreseeable, however, even absent precedent, that concerns of
state aid may invade a Commission decision. State aid to industry,
except in particular circumstances, is prohibited by Article 92 of the
EC Treaty.1 2' Thus, a merger threatening to proceed in violation of
the prohibition on state aid would predictably and justifiably be of
concern to the Commission.'
Although the spillover effect of McDonnell Douglas' defense side
may be a predictable concern of the Commission based on EC Com-
petition Law, the question remains as to whether EC law was the only
basis for the Commission's concern. The continuing tension be-
tween the United States and the EU over each entity's public financ-
ing of its commercial aircraft manufacturers, especially in the area of
research and development, suggests that general economic policy is-
sues may have been the true source of the Commission's concern.
COMM'N, XXVTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1995, at 61-65, 159-78 (1996) [hereinafter
REPORT ON COMPETITION 1995] (same); EUROPEAN COMM'N, XXIVTHREPORT ON COMPETITION
POLICY 1994, at 456-64 (1995) (same); REPORT ON COMPETITION 1993, supra note 38, at 173-89
[hereinafter REPORT ON COMPETITION 1993] (same).
128. See EC TREATY art. 92 (prohibiting state aid except in special circumstances).
129. Although, in the above discussion, the spillover effect of state aid from McDonnell
Douglas' defense division to Boeing's commercial division is viewed as a possible violation of
Article 92, the spillover effect could also be seen as an element that may strengthen Boeing's
ability to compete-i.e., greater research and development capacity-and hence strengthen its
dominant position. See infra Part IV.C.
130. See U.S. Government Support to U.S. Commercial Aircraft Industry During the Past 15 Years
Exceeds $33 Billion, OFFICIAL PRESS RELEASE EUR. UNION IP/91/1084 (Eur. Comm'n, Brussels,
Belg.), Dec. 4, 1991 (maintaining that an extensive study provides "conclusive evidence" that
the U.S. government has provided between $33.5 and $41.5 billion to enhance the competi-
tiveness of its commercial aircraft manufacturers in the world market between 1976 and 1990).
The EU contends that U.S. commercial aircraft manufacturers benefited largely from Defense
Department and NASA program grants, and criticized the United States for the lack of trans-
parency in its subsidization of commercial aircraft manufacturers. See id. In 1992, the United
States and the EU reached an agreement on the subsidization of each other's respective com-
mercial aircraft manufacturers. See Agreement Between the European Economic Community
and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Application of the GATT
Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft and on Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, 1992 O.J. (L 301)
32. The Agreement generally prohibits direct government support for the production of large
civil aircraft. See id. art. 3. It allows, however, direct government support for development of
large commercial aircraft only when a "project appraisal, based on conservative assumptions,
has established that there is a reasonable expectation of recoupment" of all government costs,
including interest within 17 years. See id. art. 4.1. The amount of development aid is limited to
25% of the project's total development costs, recoverable at an interest rate "no less than the
cost of borrowing to the government," plus eight percent of the project's development cost,
recoverable at an interest rate "no less than the cost of borrowing to the government plus 1%."
Id. art. 4.2.
The Agreement also prohibits indirect government aid exceeding three percent of the an-
nual commercial turnover of the civil aircraft industry in the party concerned and four percent
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Although the Commission's decision and prior press releases empha-
size that this is not the case,' continuing EU objections to U.S. gov-
ernment involvement in the commercial aircraft industry suggest that
the Commission saw the Boeing decision as a chance to state its dis-
content with the United States' indirect subsidization of its aircraft
manufacturers. 13 If this was the EU's goal, it succeeded. Not only
did the EU remind the United States of its opposition to its aid to
U.S. aircraft manufacturers, but the EU compelled Boeing to report
directly to it on any potential spillover of state-funded research and
development to its commercial aircraft division.3'
C. Expansion of Boeing's Market Share and Other Factors
Strengthening Dominance
Market share is a central element of EC merger analysis. Article 2
of the Merger Regulation specifies that concentrations within the
scope of the Regulation will be appraised, among other factors, on
the "market position of the undertakings concerned."'' 4 Past Com-
mission decisions have consistently interpreted this language to re-
quire an assessment of the market shares of the companies involved
in a concentration.35 This assessment will then be used, among other
of the annual commercial turnover for large civil aircraft of any one firm of the party con-
cerned. (Party here means either the United States or EU-whatever body is granting the aid.)
See id. art. 5.2. The Agreement considers indirect aid any identifiable reduction of production
costs resulting from government-funded research and development in the aeronautical area.
See id. art. 5.3. The Agreement also provides for the regular exchange of information and con-
sultation regarding the aid granted to each party's industry. See id. arts. 8, 11. The Commis-
sion, however, is unsatisfied with the Agreement's results. See EUROPEAN COMM'N, REPORT ON
UNITED STATES BARRIERS TO TRADE AND INVESTMENT 1997, at 31 (July 1997) [hereinafter U.S.
BARRIERS TO TRADE AND INVESTMENT]. The Commission maintains that "the Agreement suffers
from an important divergence between the U.S. and EU in the way to interpret the indirect
support discipline, and on the European side, there is the concern that its implementation has
created an increasing imbalance of obligations." Id. The Commission calculated that in 1995,
the U.S. commercial aircraft industry received indirect support well in excess of the amount
provided for in the Agreement-according to EU calculations between 8.8% and 15.9% of U.S.
manufacturers' commercial turnover. See id. at 32.
131. See Commission Clears Merger, supra note 61 (stating that the Commission's decision was
based on EC law and past precedent); Analysis of Boeing-McDonnell Douglas File, supra note 15
(asserting that the Commission's decision was based strictly on EC Competition Policy and
.nothing else").
132. See U.S. BARRIERS TO TRADE AND INVESTMENT, supra note 130, at 31-32 (articulating EU
concern with U.S. Government aid to its civil aircraft manufacturers in July 1997, the same
month the Commission announced its decision on the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger).
133. See Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Decision, supra note 2, at 39 (conditioning approval in
part on Boeing's commitment to report any potential spillover effects to the Commission).
134. Regulation 4064/89, art. 2.1 (b), supra note 21, at 16 (stipulating the factors to con-
sider in an assessment of a merger).
135. See REPORT ON COMPETITION 1996, supra note 127, at 171-89 (summarizing the year's
Commission decisions and including discussions of market share in all phase two inquires);
REPORT ON COMPETITION 1995, supra note 127, at 159-78 (same); REPORT ON COMPETITION
1994, supra note 127, at 456-64 (same); REPORT ON COMPETITION 1993, supra note 38, at 173-89
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factors, to judge whether a concentration creates or strengthens a
dominant position, and if so, whether this creation or strengthening
would "significantly impede" competition. ' 36
The Merger Regulation in its recital indicates that combined mar-
ket shares of a concentration amounting to less than 25% will be pre-
sumed to be compatible with EC law.' The Regulation does not
stipulate the market share required to provoke a presumption of a
merger's incompatible with EC law. The Commission has found,
however, a concentration resulting in a market share as low as 30%
sufficient to justify a ruling of incompatibility.5 8 With its acquisition
of McDonnell Douglas, Boeing's market share would reach 70%."39 It
is understandable, then, that control over two-thirds of the market by
a single competitor would generate considerable concern for the
Commission.
Merger Regulation, however, specifies that it is the creation or
strengthening of a dominant position which is to be the situation
guarded against."' The mere existence of a dominance position,
without more, is not a violation under the Merger Regulation.1
4
1
Thus, to justify its opposition to the merger, the Commission would
need to show that the additional six percent of the market Boeing
stood to gain in its acquisition of McDonnell Douglas would amount
to a strengthening of Boeing dominant position in the market for
commercial aircraft. In its decision the Commission concluded that
McDonnell Douglas' market share was not reflective of its impact on
the conditions of competition.14 According to the Commission,
(same).
136. See Regulation 4064/89, art. 2, supra note 21, at 17 ("A concentration which creates or
strengthens a dominant position as a result of which effective competition would be signifi-
candy impeded ... shall be declared incompatible with the common market.").
137. See Regulation 4064/89, recital 15, supra note 21, at 15.
138. See Commission Decision 94/811, 1994 O.J. (L 332) 48 (Shell/Montecatini Decision)
(declaring a merger resulting in a market share of 30% incompatible with the common mar-
ket). The Commission, however, has found mergers resulting in 50% and 60% market share
compatible with EC Law. See REPORT ON COMPETITION 1996, supra note 127, at 171, 179-80
(discussing the Bosch/Allied Signal and Schering/Gehe-Jenapharm mergers, which resulted in
50% and 60% total market shares, respectively, but which both were found to be compatible
with EC law). In both cases, the Commission found the strength of competitors to be sufficient
to ward off any anticompetitive effects that might be caused by the increase in market share.
See id.
139. See Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Decision, supra note 2, at 25.
140. See Regulation 4064/89, art. 2.3, supra note 21, at 17 (stating that a "concentration
which creates or strengthens a dominant position ... shall be declared incompatible with the
common market").
141. See EUROPEAN UNION LA WAFrER MAAsTRIcHT, supra note 12, at 433 (quoting former
EC Competition Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan as stating that" [r] elatively high market shares,
together with other factors which suggest dominance may not in themselves necessarily be de-
cisive considerations").
142. See Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Decision, supra note 2, at 25 (stating that the effect of
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McDonnell Douglas' six percent share of the market was enough to
force Boeing to improve its price and purchasing conditions to in-
duce customers to purchase Boeing planes over ones produced by
McDonnell Douglas.43 With the loss of McDonnell Douglas as an in-
dependent company, this source of competition would disappear,
giving Boeing a greater opportunity to control price and purchasing
conditions 44-- a basic indication of a strengthened dominant posi-
tion.'4
In addition to looking at how an increase in a company's market
shares affects competition,'46 the Merger Regulation instructs the
Commission to consider both the relationship between the concen-
tration's market share and its economic and financial power, and the
market shares and competitive potential of the concentration's com-
petitors.' 47 The stronger the merged company's economic and finan-
McDonnell Douglas on the conditions of competition in the market for large commercial air-
craft was higher than reflected by its market share). Even if McDonnell Douglas' market share
had been reflective of its competitiveness, past Commission decisions suggest that Boeing's 6%
increase in market share through its acquisition of McDonnell-Douglas would have been
enough to justify a finding of incompatibility with EC law. See Commission Decision 96/346,
1996 O.J. (L 134) 32, 43-5 (RTL/Veronica Decision) (finding a concentration increasing a
competitor's market share 10%-from 50 to 60%-a violation of EC law). See also Commission
Orders Blockker to Divest Dutch Toys "R" US Operations, OFFICIAL PRESS RELEASE OF THE EUR. UNION
IP/97/570 (Eur. Comm'n, Brussels, Belgium),June 26, 1997 [hereinafter Blockker/Toys "R" US]
(finding that a concentration resulting in only a small increase in market share, but contribut-
ing considerable market potential, to be incompatible with EC law when the acquiring com-
pany already occupied a position of dominance due in part to its "different retail formulae"
and its "gatekeeper position vis-a-vis suppliers with regard to access to the retail market").
143. See Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Decision, supra note 2 at 25. (noting that Commission
conducted a study that demonstrated the existence of McDonnell Douglas as a competitor in-
fluenced the outcome of the airlines' negotiations with Boeing in terms of price and purchas-
ing conditions).
144. See id. (finding that the loss of McDonnell Douglas as a competitor would decrease
Boeing's incentive to offer competitive prices).
145. See Folsom, supra note 12, at 432 (explaining how ability to control price indicates a
dominant position).
146. See EUROPEAN UNION LAW AFFER MAASTRICHT, supra note 12, at 430 (explaining that
the Commission uses a variety of factors in its examination of mergers). In RTL/Veronica, for
example, the Commission looked not only at the fact that HMG (the name of the merged
companies), would achieve a market share of at least 60% in the TV advertising market, but
also at its audience share, its ability to coordinate the program schedules of its three channels
("in order to attract a maximum of viewers and to target the most attractive groups for advertis-
ers"), its ability to directly counteract the programming of competing channels and new en-
trants, and the structural link with a production company, which would allow it preferential
access to new productions. See id. Commission Decision 96/649, 1996 O.J. (L 294) 14, 15
(RTL/Veronica II). See also REPORT ON COMPETITION 1996, supra note 127, at 187-89
(discussing the Commission's reasons for disapproving the joint venture of Saint-
Gobain/Wacker-Chemie/NOM which included consideration of its 60% market share, as well
as its technological ingenuity, its ability to provide a whole range of product grades, the weak-
ness of its competitors, and the improbability of new market entrants).
147. See Regulation 4064/89, art. 2.1, supra note 21, at 16 (instructing the Commission to
take into consideration "the actual or potential competition from undertakings located
whether within or outwith the Community" and "the market position of the undertakings con-
cerned and their economic and financial power").
1998] BOEING-MCDONNELL DOUGLAS MERGER 1055
cial power as compared to its market share, the more likely it is that
the Commission will find the concentration in violation of EG law.
148
Similarly, the stronger a concentration's competitive potential and
relative market shares as compared to its competitors, the more likely
the Commission is to rule against the merger. In making these as-
sessments, the Commission has looked at customer base, 5 preferen-
tial access to supplies and other essential elements of production, 5'
additional competitive potential, and other specific company
strengths.' 52 The Commission examines both the parties to the
merger and their competitors, as well as the potential shifts in the
market due to changes in technology, and supply and demand
trends.'
148. See Commission Decision 96/346, supra note 142 (finding that a concentration be-
tween the Netherlands' future leading broadcaster and a TV production company already
dominant in the Dutch market-due in part to its specific strengths such as a large number of
popular formats, preferential access to foreign formats, and contracts with a high number of
popular Dutch TV personalities- would result in a large unchallenged sales basis (i.e., finan-
cial power), constituting an unacceptable impediment to competition).
149. See Commission Decision 96/346, supra note 142, at 47 (noting that a concentration,
which would place the concentration in a market position "high above that of the other players
in the market," contributed significantly to the Commission's incompatible ruling). Cf. REPORT
ON COMPETITION 1994, supra note 127, at 457 (discussing the Mannesmann/Vallourec/Ilva
merger in which the Commission found that a concentration resulting in a duopoly for seam-
less stainless steel tubes was not a significant impediment to competition given the power of
producers outside the EU to compete with the duopoly).
150. See Commission Decision 96/346, supra note 142, at 49-50 (noting that combination of
commercial channels created by the concentration would give the concentration a high audi-
ence share, which was the most important parameter for the concentration's customer base
and that a structural link created by the concentration would secure an unchallenged customer
base for the merging company).
151. See id. at 49 (noting that a structural link between a broadcast company and a produc-
tion company would give the broadcast company preferential access to productions and hence
further the concentration's competitive advantage to the detriment of competitors); REPORT
ON COMPETITION 1996, supra note 127, at 179 (discussing the Commission's concern in
Rewe/Billa that the merged company would have joint purchasing power, possibly leading to
anticompetitive effects); Blockker/Toys "R" US, supra note 142, at 1 (noting that a dominant
company's position as a "gatekeeper" vis-A-vis suppliers contributed to the Commission's find-
ing of incompatibility).
152. See Commission Decision 96/346, supra note 142, at 48 (demonstrating that a produc-
tion company's specific strengths, such as popular formats and contracts with a number of
popular TV personalities, were contributing factors in the Commission's incompatible ruling).
153. See Commission Decision 96/177, 1996 O.J. (L 53) 20 (Nordic Satellite Distribution
Decision) (denying approval of joint venture, but noting that changes in technology may alter
the market so as to make the venture compatible with the common market); Commission Deci-
sion 95/255, 1995 OJ. (L 161) 27 (Siemens/Italtel Decision) (finding that a merger between
two telecommunications equipment manufacturers would not result in market dominance due
in part to actual and potential technological developments leading to structural changes in the
telecommunications market); Commission Decision 94/893, 1994 O.J. (L 354) 32, 60-62
(Proctor & Gamble/Schickedanz Decision) (finding that the merged company's 60% market
share would impede competition when its main competitor's market share totaled only 10% to
15%, and new competitors faced significant barriers to market entry); Commission Decision
94/811, supra note 138, at 48 (finding that a proposed merger between Shell and Montedison,
leading to the concentration of the two main polypropylene producers, would significantly im-
pede competition when the parties' competitors did not represent a significant constraint on
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In the Boeing case, the Commission, in addition to noting the in-
crease in Boeing's market share from sixty-four percent to seventy
percent, 4 also explored the relationship between Boeing's market
share and its financial and economic position. The Commission con-
sidered the following factors in its decision: (1) the increase in cus-
tomer base (from sixty percent to eighty-four percent); 5 (2) the su-
perior bargaining power with suppliers due to its involvement in
both defense and civil aircraft production; and (3) the remaining
competitive potential of McDonnell Douglas.16 The Commission's
use of these factors in prior cases illustrates the consistency of the
Commission's decision on the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger
with past Commission investigations regarding the compatibility of a
proposed merger with EC law.
57
The Commission also looked at the ability of the only other com-
petitor on the market: Airbus. The Commission noted that although
Airbus' market share had increased in the 1980s and early 1990s, that
it had since declined to roughly 30%, demonstrating Airbus' present
difficulty in attacking Boeing's market position.'58 The Commission
also cited Airbus' inability to forge "significant inroad[s] in most of
the top ten operators' fleets" as evidence of Airbus' limited ability to
compete with Boeing. 9 Additional factors the Commission found to
demonstrate the constraint on Airbus' ability to compete with Boeing
included: (1) that Airbus, unlike Boeing, could not offer a "family of
aircraft," and (2) that Airbus planes only accounted for fourteen per-
cent of the fleet in service.' 6° Both factors, according to the Commis-
sion, influenced customer purchasing decisions. An inability to offer
a complete family of aircraft influenced customers' purchasing deci-
their market power and new market entrants were unlikely); REPORT ON COMPETITION 1996,
supra note 127, at 179-80 (discussing the Schering/Geh-Jenapharm case in which the Commis-
sion held that the strength of the parties' competitors, demand mobility, and a highly innova-
tive market were sufficient to prevent any strengthening of the parties' dominant position
based on its control of 60% of the market share); id. at 178 (discussing the BP/Mobil case in
which the Commission concluded that the strength of the parties' competitors and the likeli-
hood of new market entrants was sufficient to prevent a creation of a dominant position).
154. See Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Decision, supra note 2, at 24-25.
155. See id. at 26-27. The Commission felt that such power could be used to enter into addi-
tional exclusive arrangements like those already existing with Continental, Delta, and Ameri-
can, or to gain an unfair foothold in capturing the former customers of McDonnell Douglas.
See id. at 27-28.
156. See id at 18. The Commission also looked at the exclusive supply contracts between
Boeing and three major air carriers, as well as the spillover effect of McDonnell Douglas' pub-
licly-funded defense division. These factors are discussed supra Part IV.A-B.
157. See supra notes 140-53 (citing past Commission decisions involving these factors).
158. See Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Decision, supra note 2, at 21. But see Goldsmith, supra
note 2, at Al (reporting that in 1997 Airbus increased its market share from 30% to 45%).
159. See Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Decision, supra note 2, at 21.
160. See id. at 22-23.
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sions because of a preference, identified by the Commission, of cus-
tomers to fulfill their entire fleet requirements with planes from a
single manufacturer.1 6  Because Boeing's acquisition of McDonnell
Douglas would grant it monopolies on the smallest narrow-body and
largest wide-body segments, Boeing would be the only manufacturer
with the ability to cater to this preference.' 6 Second, the fact that
Airbus accounted for only fourteen percent of the fleet in service in-
fluenced customers' purchasing decisions because of a second pref-
erence, identified by the Commission, of air carriers to purchase
from the manufacturer of their existing fleet,'63 due to the cost sav-
ings derived from a "commonality of benefits."'"
The Commission's above analysis is fairly consistent with EC law
and past cases. The Merger Regulation suggests that a concentra-
tion's effect on a competitor should be taken into account, 65 and past
Commission decisions have consistently done so.'6 Furthermore, a
market in which a competitor controls only 30% of the market and
faces other obstacles to competition, has spurred the Commission in
the past to deny a merger approval absent modifications. 67 Thus, the
Commission's concern with Airbus' 30% market share and its investi-
gation into additional obstacles impeding the ability of Airbus to
compete with Boeing, are consistent with prior merger decisions)6
161. Seeid.at2l-22.
162. See id. (finding that Airbus could not offer the same family of aircraft as Boeing be-
cause it lacked planes at the extreme ends of the market for narrow- and wide-bodyjets).
163. See id at 23 (listing the examples of cost savings from "commonality of benefits," in-
cluding "engineering spares inventory and flight crew qualifications").
164. See id. at 23 (stating the importance of existing fleet in service in customer purchasing
decisions).
165, See Regulation 4064/89, art. 2, supra note 21, at 16 (stating that decisions should re-
flect the effects of a concentration on actual or potential competition from companies both in
and out of the EU).
166. Commission Decision 94/893, supra note 153, at 62 (finding that Proctor & Gamble's
market dominance would impede competition from existing competitors and create significant
barriers to market entry); REPORT ON COMPETITION 1996, supra note 127, at 179 (discussing the
Schering/Geh-Jenapharm case in which the Commission considered the strength of the par-
ties' competitors, demand mobility, and a highly innovative market sufficient to prevent any
strengthening of the parties' dominant position based on their control of 60% of the market);
id. at 178 (discussing the BP/Mobil case in which the Commission considered the strength of
the parties' competitors, as well as the likelihood of new market entrants, as sufficient to pre-
vent a creation of a dominant position).
167. See Commission Decision 91/619, 1991 O.J. (L 334) 42 (denying a merger approval
when competitors controlled only 25-30% of relevant markets); Commission Decision 96/346,
supra note 142 at 32 (denying merger approval when competitors controlled only 40% of the
relevant market).
168. The Commission's consideration of the merger's effect on competitors resulted in the
accusation that the Commission was more concerned with the merger's effect on competitors,
i.e., Airbus, than with its effect in competition. See A Dangerous Merger?, supra note 18, at A22
(questioning whether the EU's reaction really resulted from a desire to protect its own aircraft
manufacturing industry). It should be noted, however, that consideration of the merger's ef-
fects on Airbus was a means for the Commission to ascertain whether the merger was a signifi-
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D. Remedies
The orders to end and refrain from entering exclusive supply con-
tracts with air carriers, to report potentially anticompetitive behavior
to the Commission (i.e., the potential spillover from the defense divi-
sion), and to grant nonexclusive licenses are supported by past
Commission decisions. 69 However, the Commission's ring-fencing
remedy aimed at reducing the anticompetitiveness of the merger due
to its increased market share and customer base, and its enhanced
ability to negotiate with suppliers, is unusualY.17  Divestiture of part or
all of a concentration is the usual remedy for concentrations that
strengthen a dominant position so as to impede competitionY.7' The
Commission, however, noted that it could not order divestiture in the
case of Boeing because no existing manufacturer was interested in
purchasing McDonnell Douglas.' Regardless of whether the Com-
cant impediment to competition. It was not necessarily a means to support European industry.
Interestingly, such an attempt to foster European industry would not have been a contraven-
tion of EC law, for the goal of EC Competition Policy is not only to promote competition, but
also to promote the strength of European industry. See Regulation 4064/89, recitals 4, 13, su-
pra note 21, at 14-15 (stating that concentrations should be assessed in part on how they in-
crease the competitiveness of European industry and strengthen European integration); see also
REPORT ON COMPETITION 1996, supra note 127, at 18 (stating the Commission's policy to
.promote the competitiveness of European industry as a whole by the strict enforcement of the
competition rules").
169. See generally Commission on Decision 94/811, supra note 138, at 70; Commission on
Decision 93/406, supra note 114, at 36 (ordering Langnese to end its exclusive supply con-
tracts); REPORT ON COMPETITION 1996, supra note 127, at 186 (discussing the Commission's ap-
proval of a merger between pharmaceutical companies Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz contingent, in
part, on the companies' agreement to grant nonexclusive licenses to third parties); REPORT ON
COMPETITION 1995, supra note 127, at 163 (discussing Glaxo's commitment to grant a license of
one of its two migraine therapies under development to a third party to avoid an incompatibil-
ity ruling on its acquisition of Wellcome).
170. See Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Decision, supra note 2, at 36, 39 (agreeing to the Boe-
ing-McDonnell Douglas merger subject to the ring-fencing condition); cf REPORT ON COM-
PETITION 1996, supra note 127, at 187 (discussing Kesko/Tuko case in which Commission held
that although Kesko and its retailers were separate legal entities, they nonetheless comprised a
.centrally planned retailing organization"). In Kesko/Tuko, the Commission found it neces-
sary to view Kesko and its retailers (rather than Kesko alone) as the party to the proposed
merger with Tuko. The fact that Kesko and its retailers were separate legal entities did not de-
crease the potential for anticompetitive behavior. The Commission took into account the fact
that Kesko and its retailers possessed a number of shared "characteristics," such as "agreements
between [Kesko and its retailers,] the organization of the groups as regards sourcing, market-
ing operations and joint presentation of logos, the ownership by (Kesko] of retailing premises,
and financial commitments" made by the retailers to Kesko. See REPORT ON COMPETITION 1996,
supra note 127, at 186-87 (discussing the Kesko/Tuko merger).
171. See REPORT ON COMPETITION 1995, supra note 127, at 64-65 (1996) (discussing the cases
of Mercedes Benz/Klssbohrer, ABA/Daimler Benz, Orkla/Volvo and Crown Cork and
Seal/Carnaud Metal Box in which the Commission approved the proposed mergers only after
the parties involved agreed to significant divestitures); see also Commission Decision 96/649,
supra note 146, at 14 (approving a proposed joint venture but only after Endemol, the produc-
tion company initially party to the venture, excused itself).
172. See Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Decision, supra note 2, at 17-18, 39 (discussing reasons
why divestiture was not an option for resolving competition problems the merger introduced).
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mission's decision was the only pragmatic solution, it is still a devia-
tion from past practice.'"
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION
The Commission's analysis of the Boeing merger was, for the most
part, consistent with the Merger Regulation and past Commission
decisions. The existence of the exclusive supply contracts and the in-
crease in market share, as well as the economic strength of Boeing
with suppliers and customers, and the competitive potential of
McDonnell Douglas, are factors, relied upon by the Commission in
the Boeing case, which have also formed the basis of past Commis-
sion decisions on whether a proposed merger was compatible with
EC law. 74 The Commission's unusual ring-fencing remedy and, per-
haps, its investigation of the potential spill-over of state-funded re-
search and development from McDonnell Douglas' defense division
to Boeing's commercial division, however, do indicate some incon-
gruity between the Boeing decision and prior decisions. 75  This in-
congruity alone, however, is not enough to support the accusations,
offered on the eve of the decision, that the Commission's investiga-
tion of the merger was unwarranted or merely an effort to unfairly
Given that no one other than Boeing was prepared to purchase McDonnell Douglas, the
Commission noted that a divestiture order in the Boeing case would do little to promote com-
petition in the aircraft manufacturing industry. See id. at 39. Had McDonnell Douglas' ability
to compete further declined, an inability to maintain customers and generate revenues eventu-
ally would have forced McDonnell Douglas to exit the market, leaving only Boeing and Airbus
as the remaining competitors. See id. U.S. officials warned against this outcome because it
would result in an "inefficient disposition" of McDonnell Douglas' manufacturing operations
and the loss of employment for may Americans. See id. at 17-18. Presumably, EU officials op-
posed this outcome because, at least with an order to "ring-fence" McDonnell Douglas' defense
division and have Boeing report annually on spillovers of state-funded research and develop-
ment, the EU stood to gain some influence over the shape of a post-McDonnell Douglas air-
craft market.
173. See EUROPEAN COMM'N XXII REPORT ON COMPETITION 1992, at 22 (1993) (stating that
conditions which the Commission imposes consists mainly of divestitures or agreements to
withdraw from the market where anticompetitive effects would ensue). The Commission's ap-
proval of the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger pursuant to the ring-fencing, rather than an
order to divest, suggests that contrary to popular opinion, the EU was looking for a way to ap-
prove the merger. Consistent with the Merger Regulation and past decisions, the Commission,
after finding that the proposed merger significantly strengthened Boeing's dominant position,
could have refused to approve the merger unless Boeing agreed to a partial divestiture of
McDonnell Douglas. See supra note 171 (listing cases in which divestiture was required to obtain
Commission approval). Nonetheless, the Commission agreed to the remedy. See Boeing-
McDonnell Douglas Decision, supra note 2, at 39 (agreeing to the merger subject to the ring-
fencing and other commitment).
174. See supra Part IV (discussing consistency of EU's Boeing-McDonnell Douglas decision
with past decisions and EC law).
175. See supra Part IV.B, D (discussing the unusual investigation into spillovers of state aid
and the Commission's ring-fencing remedy).
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support Airbus in the market for commercial aircraft.17 6 The Com-
mission's decision, even taking into account some incongruity, was
made in accordance with its laws and past precedent.
7
The general consistency of the Commission's decision on the Boe-
ing-McDonnell Douglas merger is important for two reasons. First,
consistent decisions lead to predictability that is essential for firms at-
tempting to structure mergers compatible with EC law. Second, con-
sistent decisions based on the rule of law lend legitimacy to the EU as
a real and powerful player in mergers of international significance.
Legitimacy is particularly significant in this case, because it narrows
the essential issue posed by the U.S.-EU conflict over the Boeing-
McDonnell Douglas merger. The issue in this case is not that the EU
acted arbitrarily or purely out of a desire to advance Airbus, but
rather that the EU nearly reached a conclusion contrary to the
United States, despite the fact that the EU acted in accordance with
its own laws and past decisions. Thus, the means for preventing a fu-
176. See supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text (detailing controversy surrounding Boe-
ing-McDonnell Douglas merger and U.S. accusations of EU protectionism).
177. A lack of perfect inconsistency between the Boeing decision and other decisions may
in part be explained by the flexibility allowed by the Merger Regulation and EC Competition
Policy in general. Although the Merger Regulation lists factors that the Commission should
consider in reaching a conclusion on a given concentration, it does not provide a precise check
list of elements necessary to guide the Commission in determining whether a concentration is
compatible with the common market. See Regulation 4064/89, art. 2.1 (a)-(b), supra note 21, at
16 (stating that Commission's assessment must consider various aspects of a concentration and
.shall take into account.., the need to maintain and develop effective competition" in view of
several factors, but providing no strict list of acceptable and unacceptable behavior). Instead,
the commission has emphasized the importance of looking at the specific circumstance of each
concentration and analyzing the concentration's compatibility using criteria it feels most ap-
propriate considering that circumstance. See REPORT ON COMPETITION 1994, supra note 127, at
24 (emphasizing importance Commission attaches in its review of concentrations to context
and particularities of each sector); see aLso REPORT ON COMPETITION 1996, supra note 127, at 61-
66, 170-89 (discussing various factors and different circumstances the Commission considered
in its 1996 merger decisions); REPORT ON COMPETITION 1995, supra note 127, at 61-66, 159-77
(discussing factors considered in Commission's merger decisions in 1995); REPORT ON
COMPETITION 1994, supra note 127, at 456-64 (discussing Commission's consideration of vari-
ous circumstances in 1994 merger decisions); REPORT ON COMPETITION 1993, supra note 38, at
173-87 (discussing the various factors and circumstances considered in the Commission's
merger decisions in 1993). Furthermore, consideration of the broad policy goals of furthering
European integration and strengthening the competitiveness of European industry, expressed
in both the Merger Regulation and the EC Treaty, may influence Commission decisions. See
EC TREATY arts. 1-3 (stating that the Community's "task" is "to promote throughout the Com-
munity a harmonious and balanced development of economic activities" through establish-
ment of the common market). Regulation 4064/89, supra note 21, at 15 (recognizing that, to
achieve its goals, Commission must consider, among other things, the EC Treaty objective of
strengthening EC "economic and social cohesion"); see also REPORT ON COMPETITION 1995, su-
pra note 127, at 67 (discussing Perrier case, in which Court of First Instance held that although
Merger Regulation primarily involves questions of competition, Commission may still consider
social effects of a concentration). Because of the political repercussions of admitting such,
there is no way of knowing how much the EU's goal of strengthening or preserving European
industry (i.e., Airbus) affected the Commission's decision to investigate and press for conces-
sions in the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas case.
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ture Boeing-like crisis lies in reconciling the differences in the appli-
cation of EC and U.S. competition law.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. The Failure of the Present System to Address Conflicts between EU and
U.S. Competition Policy
Finding a solution to the potential clash between U.S. and EU anti-
trust law is not a new endeavor.'78 In 1991, the United States and the
EU signed the Agreement Between the Government of the United
States of America and the Commission of the European Communi-
ties Regarding the Application of Their Competition Laws ("U.S.-EU
Agreement" or "Agreement").' 79 The U.S.-EU Agreement contains
four major elements: (1) notification of cases handled by the compe-
tition authorities of either party when the case concerns the
"important interests" of the other party;'o (2) cooperation and coor-
dination of the investigations and decisions formulated by each
authority;'8 ' (3) consideration of the other party's "important inter-
ests" when taking measures to enforce competition laws;... and
(4) consideration of a request for one party to initiate appropriate
enforcement measures against anticompetitive activities affecting the
178. See generallyjoseph P. Griffin, EC and U.S. Extraterritoriality: Activism and Cooperation, 17
FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 353 (1994) (discussing U.S. and EU concerns regarding extraterritorial
application of their antitrust laws).
179. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Com-
mission of the European Communities Regarding the Application of Their Competition Laws,
1995 OJ. (L 95) 47 [hereinafter U.S.-EU Agreement]. The European Commission initially
adopted the U.S.-EU Agreement in 1991, but after considering a complaint brought by France
against the Commission, the European Court of Justice found the Agreement procedurally
void. See Case C-327/91, French Republic v. Commission, [1994] E.C.R. 3641, 3661-63, 3668,
3679 (holding U.S.-EU Agreement void because Commission lacked authority to sign a treaty
"intended to produce legal effects" without formal approval of the European Council). The
European Council and the Commission readopted the Agreement without changes the follow-
ing year. See Decision of the Council and the Commission of 10 April 1995 Concerning the
Conclusion of the Agreement of the United States of America Regarding the Application of
Their Competition Laws, 1995 OJ. (L 95) 45 (readopting U.S.-EU Agreement of 1991 and de-
claring it applicable from its original date of enactment). The Agreement states that its goal is
to "promote the cooperation and coordination and lessen the possibility of impact of differ-
ences between the Parties in the application of their competition laws." U.S.-EU Agreement,
supra.
180. See U.S.-EU Agreement, supra note 179, at 47-48 (listing specific activities normally re-
quiring notification, and discussing time frame, application, and contents of notification).
181. See id. at 48-49 (indicating that one party may assist the other in enforcement activities
or coordinate their activities when mutual interests exist).
182. See id. at 49-50. The clause requiring U.S. and EU mutual consideration of each
other's important interests is often referred to as the negative comity clause. See Allison Himel-
farb, Comment, The International Language of Convergence: Reviving Antitrust Dialogue Between the
United States and the European Union with a Uniform Understanding of "Extraterritoriality," 17 U. PA.
J. INT'L ECON. L. 909, 936-37 (discussing Article 6 in terms of negative comity).
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requesting party, but occurring within the other party's territory.'"3
Despite the positive experiences reported by both the Commission
and the United States on its application,'84 the Agreement limits its
own effectiveness in instances when the antitrust authorities funda-
mentally disagree on the compatibility of a proposed merger with an-
titrust law.'ss Because the Agreement does not compel parties to co-
operate, differences in antitrust law and opinion cause the
Agreement's mechanism for cooperation to break down, allowing
each party to decide the merger without regard for the other author-
ity's assessment."'
This is similar to what occurred in the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas
case. Although the merger would have been an ideal opportunity for
the application of the U.S.-EU Agreement, it found little expression
in either authorities' review of the case.' 7 Although the EU decision
183. See U.S.-EU Agreement, supra note 179, at 49. The clause acknowledging the right of
the United States and EU to request initiation of enforcement action is often referred to as the
positive comity clause. See Himelfarb, supra note 182, at 936 (discussing Article 5 in terms of
positive comity).
184. In its first annual report to the European Council, reporting on the application of the
Agreement from April 10, 1995, to June 30, 1996, the Commission stated that its experience
with the Agreement had been "very positive." See Commission Report to the Council and the
European Parliament on the Application of the Agreement Between the European Communi-
ties and the Government of the United States of America Regarding the Application of Their
Competition Laws, COM (96) 479 final at 4; see also id. at 6-10, 13 (recounting contact between
the United States and EU regarding actual and potential antitrust violations affecting both par-
ties, and concluding that the only significant problems in the Agreement's application cen-
tered on the exchange of confidential information). A case often heralded as proof of the
U.S.-EU Agreement's success is that of Microsoft. SeeREPORT ON COMPETITION 1994, supra note
127, at 27 (citing Microsoft case as an exceptional example of collaboration between U.S. and
EU antitrust authorities, but noting that its success depended on the parties' willingness to ex-
change confidential information).
More recently, U.S. and EU antitrust authorities, while carrying on separate investigations,
continued to consult with each other during the course of their investigations. SeeVarney, su-
pra note 12, at 4-5 (noting that in Glaxo/Wellcome case, the FTC and EU Commission con-
sulted to "identify the product markets of mutual concern, the likely competitive effects, and
the best available remedy" to address each authority's anticompetitive concerns). FTC Chair-
man Christine Varney also noted, however, that the cooperation between the FTC and the EU
highlighted the different approaches taken by the two antitrust authorities. See id. at 5 (stating
that the FTC's and EU's analysis reflect differences in application of two authorities' antitrust
laws).
185. See U.S.-EU Agreement, supra note 179, at 47-50 (containing no provisions for the
Agreement's enforcement); Laura E. Keegan, Comment, The 1991 U.S./EC Competition Agree-
ment: A Glimpse of the Future Through the United States v. Microsoft, 2J. INT'L LEGAL STuD., 149, 151
(1996) (arguing that although useful in the Microsoft case, the U.S.-EU Agreement may pro-
vide limited assistance in cases in which the two investigating antitrust authorities' enforcement
policies diverge).
186. See U.S.-EU Agreement, supra note 179, at 49 (stating that subject to appropriate no-
tice, either party may limit or terminate its participation in coordinated investigations); arts.
5.4, 9, supra, at 49-50 (emphasizing that nothing in agreement limits or contradicts either
party's discretion to implement enforcement actions under its own laws or policies).
187. See Cool Heads Needed in Brussels and Washington, supra note 60, at 16 (stating that "[i]f
there was a case for close co-operation between the EU and the U.S. competition authorities,
Boeing's acquisition of McDonnell Douglas must surely be it").
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expressly states that the Commission consulted with U.S. antitrust
authorities pursuant to the U.S.-EU Agreement, and that it consid-
ered the "important defense interests" of the U.S. government in its
merger decision,'8 the FTC opinion is devoid of even a passing refer-
ence to the agreement.'9 Furthermore, the official"O communication
that did take place between U.S. and EU authorities first occurred
three and a half months after the Commission announced it would
proceed with a phase two investigation of the merger, and four days
before the FTC announced its decision. 9' The United States did not
apprise the EU of its concerns until July 13, 1997, a mere two weeks
before the EU reached its conclusion.9  The vast majority of each
party's investigation and analysis of the merger occurred in isolation.
It is not surprising then, given this lack of communication coupled
with the difference in EU and U.S. antitrust law, that the two authori-
ties nearly reached fundamentally different views on the same
merger. The limited interaction between the United States and the
EU in this case highlights the weakness of the Agreement.9 3  The
consultative and information-sharing basis of the U.S.-EU Agreement
confirm its limited strength. The Agreement can only facilitate co-
operation; it cannot compel it.
Several other attempts have been made to avoid international crisis
like the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger: (1) the International
Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act, which empowers U.S. antitrust
authorities to share confidential information with other nations' anti-
trust authorities-so long as the information remains confidential;
4
(2) the Trans-Atlantic Business Dialogue, designed to facilitate inter-
action between U.S. and EU businesses with the hope that both sides
can help educate the other about complying with each other's regu-
188. See Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Decision, supra note 2, at 17-18 (stating that, in com-
pliance with U.S.-EU Agreement, EU notified the United States of the Commission's prelimi-
nary finding and asked the United States to consider important EU interests); Commission Clears
Merger, supra note 61, at 2-4 (stating that the Commission consulted with the United States and
took into account U.S. interests in accordance with Agreement).
189. See In re Boeing Company/McDonnell Douglas Corp., supra note 6 (containing no ref-
erence to the U.S.-EU Agreement).
190. There is no way to know how much informal communication went on outside the
specture of the general public.
191. SeeBoeing-McDonnell Douglas Decision, supra note 2, at 17-18 (stating that the EU did
not notify the United States of the Commission's preliminary conclusions and concerns until
June 26, 1997, and that FTC announced its approval of the merger onJuly 1, 1997).
192. See id.
193. See id. (describing communication between the United States and EU about the
merger); see also International Framework, supra note 35, at 424 (noting that bilateral agree-
ments like the U.S.-EU Agreement may be less effective due to their lack of substantive rules or
principles).
194. See International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6201,
6207 (1994).
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latory authorities;'95 (3) provisions within the New Transatlantic
Agenda aimed at strengthening the U.S.-EU Agreement and the en-
forcement of competition laws;196 and (4) "working groups" within
the Organization on Economic Cooperation and Development
("OECD") and the World Trade Organization ("WTO") to study is-
sues relating to trade and competition policy.'97 Although these ef-
forts have contributed to cooperation among competition authori-
ties, they fail to fully resolve the problem presented in the Boeing
case, namely what to do in the event that two antitrust authorities
reach contrary decisions on the same proposed merger.
B. Toward a Solution
Unfortunately finding a means to reconcile, and optimally avoid,
conflicting merger decisions is not easy. Two general approaches
dominate the debate over how to most appropriately deal with future
conflicts. The first is to establish a recognized procedure for recon-
ciling competing antitrust decisions based on internationally agreed
upon antitrust standards.'98 Such a procedure could be developed
under the existing dispute resolution framework of the WTO, which
provides a formal mechanism for members to reconcile trade dis-
putes and has the authority to issue binding decisions.'9 The WTO's
195. See U.S. BARRIERS TO TRADE AND INVESTMENT, supra note 130, at 1-2 (discussing benefits
of Trans-Atlantic Business Dialogue).
196. See id. (discussing U.S. and EU efforts through New Transatlantic Agenda to improve
cooperative enforcement of competition laws); Varney, supra note 12, at 16 (opining that U.S.
cooperation with New Transatlantic Agenda will improve effectiveness and efficiency of anti-
trust enforcement).
197. See REPORT ON COMPETITION 1996, supra note 127, at 377 (reporting WTO's establish-
ment of Working Party to examine links between trade and competition policy issues); Anti-
trust Division Official Predicts Scant Prospect of International Code, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
No. 6, at 220 (Feb. 9, 1994) (discussing the OECD working group's idea for establishing an in-
ternational antitrust authority).
198. See International Framework, supra note 35, at 417-30 (discussing possibility of creating
international antitrust rules). The FTC has considered and rejected the possibility of interna-
tional antitrust rules. See FTC Chairman Robert Pitofsky, International Antitrust: An FTC Per-
spective, Remarks Before the Fordham Corporate Law Institute 22nd Annual Conference on
International Antitrust Law & Policy (Oct. 26, 1995), available at <http://www.ftc.gov/
speeches/pitofsky/fcli95.htm> (arguing that the development of an international antitrust
code is unrealistic); FTC Commissioner Roscoe B. Starek, III, Competition and Consumer Pro-
tection Enforcement: Aiming Toward a Common Goal in the Emerging Global Marketplace,
Remarks Before the 20th Annual International Business Law Institute on the Practice of Inter-
national Business Transactions (Apr. 11, 1996), available at <http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/
starek/minnbar.htm> (rejecting idea of an international antitrust code).
199. See Resolution of the European Parliament on the Twenty-Fifth Competition Report of
the European Commission 1996 OJ. (C 362)135, 139 (urging the development of an interna-
tional framework within the WTO); International Framework, supra note 35, at 424-25 (stating
that the "WTO is the prime candidate for a framework of competition rules because its institu-
tional framework provides a forum for negotiation and the arbitration of conflicts through its
dispute resolution system). Whether the WTO would be the most appropriate forum for the
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dispute resolution system would be used in cases where, upon com-
pletion of their antitrust investigations, two authorities reach conflict-
ing decisions and one authority feels the other has reached its deci-
sion in violation of international antitrust standards.2 0 The
companies involved could petition their receptive member states to
bring their case before the WTO,0 which would judge the case based
on international antitrust standards.0 2
The second approach is far more simple: do nothing. Proponents
of this position argue that further steps to harmonize antitrust laws
are premature.20 3  Thus far, conflicts, including the Boeing-
McDonnell Douglas merger, have worked themselves out.24 Accord-
ing to this point of view, the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger did
not pose a crisis. Boeing would have worked with the Commission
until the parties reached a mutually acceptable solution, and the
Commission, fearing damage to the U.S.-EU relationship or a poten-
205tial trade war, would have eventually approved the merger.
Both approaches have their drawbacks. While the establishment of
a recognized forum for resolving competing antitrust decisions is
good idea in the abstract, it is an approach that will succeed only if
development of international antitrust standards is a source of debate. Compare Varney, supra
note 12, at 14 (rejecting the WTO as the appropriate forum for discussing international anti-
trust issues and maintaining the OECD has a "comparative advantage" in analyzing and reach-
ing consensus on international issues), with International Framework, supra (finding that there
are several disadvantages to having international standards promulgated and enforced by the
OECD and that the WTO would provide a better forum).
200. See International Framework, supra note 35, at 425-26 (discussing how disputes could
be resolved by the WTO dispute resolution system); International Co-Operation in Antitrust Mat-
ters: Making the Point in the Wake of the Boeing/McDD Proceedings, EC COMPETITION POL. NEWSL.,
Feb. 1998, available at <http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/dgO4/speech/eight/ensp98004.htm>
[hereinafter International Co-Operation] (stating the dispute resolution mechanism would not be
used to review decision's rendered by national authorities, but rather to settle disputes over a
country's compliance with the established international rules). See generally WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, WTO: TRADING INTO THE FUTURE 4, 18-19 (1995) (describing forum for dis-
pute resolution and negotiations within the WTO).
201. See International Framework, supra note 35, at 426 (noting that private parties do not
have access to the WTO's dispute resolution system).
202. See id. at 426 (noting that the dispute resolution system would use internationally
agreed upon standards to judge disputes).
203. See id. at 433 (noting that substantive international rules regarding mergers is prema-
ture); International Co-Operation, supra note 200 (concluding that an international dispute reso-
lution mechanism for competition issues is "inconceivable under current circumstance"); Var-
ney, supra 12 ("U.S. Government is firmly of the view that competition issues are not ripe for
negotiations in the WTO to establish a comprehensive new framework of rules."); Pitofsky, su-
pra note 198, at 15 (agreeing with an Expert Report issued for public comment by the EU, and
finding that drafting an international antitrust code is unrealistic).
204. See International Co-Operation, supra note 200 (arguing current international coopera-
tion was sufficient in the Boeing case); supra note 185 and accompanying text (discussing posi-
tive responses to current U.S.-EU cooperation in the competition field).
205. See International Co-Operation, supra note 200 (arguing that the outcome of the Boeing
case proved the capacity of the EU to withstand international pressure and obtain concessions
from Boeing).
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there are workable standards by which to judge the antitrust dis-
pute.2° International antitrust standards, however, threaten to pro-
vide little guidance in resolving an international merger dispute simi-
lar to the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas case. °7 In order to reach an
international consensus on the standards by which to judge antitrust
disputes, particularly if these standards were then to be used by an
adjudicatory body with the authority to issue binding decisions, such
standards would necessarily consist of broad and general statements
about what constitutes anticompetitive behavior.ss On the extreme
ends of the spectrum, agreeing upon what is clearly prohibited be-
havior and what is not, would be relatively uncontroversial. 20 It is the
gray area in the middle, precisely where a dispute along the lines of
the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger would fall, which would
prove problematic in reaching an international consensus. Both the
FTC's and EU's analysis of the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger
asked whether the merger would negatively impact competition.210 In
fact both authorities looked at similar criteria (e.g. market share and
competitive potential of McDonnell Douglas) and premised their in-
vestigation on the goal of promoting consumer welfare. 1 It is doubt-
ful international standards would create a more specific basis of re-
view or a more concrete goal. Thus, while international antitrust
standards may harmonize some aspects of international antitrust
206. See International Framework, supra note 35, at 434-35 (discussing the importance of
having standards by which to judge disputes under a dispute settlement system).
207. See id. at 431, 432 (discussing how common international rules could address horizon-
tal constraints such as cartels, market sharing, boycott of foreign firms, price fixing, bid rigging,
collective exclusive dealing, but explicitly stating at present such rules would be inappropriate
for mergers).
208. See Starek, supra note 198 (expressing concern that international antitrust standards
would be standards of the "lowest-common denominator"). An international agreement of
international antitrust standards and a binding mechanism for dispute resolution brings up
issues of national sovereignty. See International Framework, supra note 35, at 425 (noting cur-
rent unwillingness of countries to accept the constraints on national sovereignty that an inter-
national antitrust code would demand); Starek, supra (noting that sovereignty issues impede
cooperation on substantive elements of international antitrust law).
209. See International Framework, supra note 35, at 426 (describing the basic practices, such
as cartels and price fixing, that would be prohibited under international antitrust rules, but
cautioning that other types of anticompetitive behavior, such as certain vertical restraints or
exclusive distribution or supply contracts, would take longer to develop).
210. See Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Decision, supra note 2, at 24 (analyzing whether the
Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger "significantly impeded" competition); In re Boe-
ing/McDonnell Douglas Corporation, supra note 6 (analyzing whether the Boeing-McDonnell
Douglas merger would "substantially lessen competition").
211. See Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Decision, supra note 2, at 24-26 (analyzing market
shares and the competitive potential of McDonnell Douglas); In re Boeing/McDonnell Douglas
Corp., supra note 6, at 2-3 (analyzing market share and the competitive potential of McDonnell
Douglas); supra note 46 (stating protection of the consumer is a primary goal of EC Competi-
tion law and U.S. antitrust law). See also supra note 177 (discussing other goals of EC Competi-
tion Policy).
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laws, they do not provide a workable solution for resolving future
merger disputes.
The opposite approach-to do nothing-is not particularly in-
structive either. Given the rapid internationalization of today's mar-
kets and the growing trend toward mergers of global proportions,2 '2 it
is unrealistic to believe that opposing national antitrust authorities
will continue to reach compatible decisions.213 It makes little sense to
wait until a crisis explodes before taking any meaningful steps to
prepare for its resolution. In the Boeing case, the explosion could
have resulted in nearly five billion dollars in fines for Boeing and loss
of the European market, or a trade war between the U.S. and EU to
the detriment of both U.S. and EU customers. 4
Instead, a proactive, yet still pragmatic, approach is to strengthen
U.S.-EU cooperation specifically in the field of merger assessments.
Although the current U.S.-EU Agreement extends to mergers, its use-
fulness in coordinating merger assessments, as the Boeing case dem-
onstrates, has proved less than successful.2 5 Part of the difficulty of
cooperating on merger assessments are the time constraints on
merger investigations and confidentiality requirements. In fact, the
recent extension of the U.S.-EU Agreement specifically excluded
217mergers from its scope.
212. See REPORT ON COMPETITION 1996, supra note 127, at 343 (reporting 131 merger noti-
fications to the EU Commission in 1996, compared to 60 in 1992); FTC Chairman Discusses
Merger Wave and Merger Enforcement at the FTC (Sept. 23, 1997), available at
<http://www.ftc.gov/opa/9709/pitmerg.htm> (noting that the number of mergers reported to
U.S. antitrust authorities has doubled in the last five years).
213. See International Framework, supra note 35, at 419 (recognizing the increase in inter-
national mergers and pointing out the potential for conflicts of law or remedy); International
Co-Operation, supra note 200, at 1 (discussing how the increase in "world-scale mergers" subjects
firms to "different competition rules with different criteria for taking decisions, different pro-
cedures, different time limits" and how such difference may result in trade disputes).
214. See supra Part III and notes 17 & 44 (discussing the Commission's power to impose
fines on Boeing and commenting on the threat of a trade war). A trade war between the U.S.
and EU would be particularly destructive given the fact that the U.S. and EU are"each other's
single largest trading partners," and that both are the other's "most important source of direct
foreign investment." See U.S. BARRIERS TO TRADE AND INVESTMENT, supra note 129, at 2-3. See
generally, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 200, at 7 (discussing how trade barriers are
self-defeating and self-destructive).
215. See U.S.-EU Agreement, supra note 179, at 47-48 (making mergers subject to the
Agreement), supra Part VIA (discussing the failings of the U.S.-EU Agreement as applied to the
Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger).
216. See REPORT ON COMPETITION 1996, supra note 127, at 308-09 (discussing how confiden-
tiality and timing issues make cooperation on international mergers difficult); see also Pitofsky,
supra note 198, at 12-14 (noting that the Shell/Montedison case could have proceeded more
easily if the United States and EU could have coordinated their investigations, but that such
coordination, was impeded by confidentiality constraints).
217. See Commission Communication to the Council Concerning the Agreement Between
the European Communities and the Government of the United States on the Application of
the Positive Comity Principles in the Enforcement of their Competition Laws, COM(97) 233
final (proposing the conclusion of an agreement between the EU and the United States to
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A reluctance to address ways to cooperate effectively in interna-
tional merger cases, however, is unwise. Mergers have constituted
the area of greatest activity in the competition field in recent years
and current trends suggest that this will continue to be the case for
some time to come.2'8 Thus, the U.S. and EU need to return to the
negotiation table to address ways in which merger investigations can
be coordinated more effectively. Time constraints and confidential-
ity requirements are not insurmountable impediments to effective
cooperation.219 The constraints U.S. and EC law place on the time in
which the relevant antitrust authority must conduct its investigation
and render a decision, need not be altered under a more rigorous
framework for international cooperation. Instead, given the limited
time in which to make an assessment in a merger case,"0 coordina-
tion should begin from the moment one authority decides that an
investigation is warranted. As far as confidentiality is concerned, the
parties under investigation, recognizing that one coordinated deci-
sion is better than two conflicting ones, could grant a limited waiver
of their confidentiality rights, or pursuant to national laws, the anti-
trust authorities could enter into special agreements so as to allow
the antitrust authorities to exchange confidential information22'
Coordination in merger assessments should continue throughout
the two authorities' investigations. It is not enough for one antitrust
authority to merely notify the other that it is beginning an investiga-
tion, or to suggest that the other authority take its interests into ac-
count. Coordination should entail actually working together. In the
final stages of their assessments, U.S. and EU antitrust officials should
work together to ensure that the decisions rendered by each author-
strengthen the positive comity principles of the 1991 U.S.-EU Agreement); see also International
Co-Operation, supra note 200, at 5 (noting that "in contrast to the 1991 Agreement mergers are
not within the scope the proposed Agreement").
218. See REPORT ON COMPETITION 1996, supra note 127, at 301 (noting that out of the 98 no-
tifications pursuant to the U.S.-EU Agreement between April 1995 and June 1996 that 66 have
involved mergers); supra note 212 (indicating the increase in mergers).
219. See International Co-Operation, supra note 200, at 5 (noting that time constraints were a
factor in the decision to exclude mergers from the proposed strengthening of the U.S.-EU
Agreement).
220. See Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, tit. II, 15 U.S.C. § 18
(setting time table for requests of information and the rendering of merger decisions by U.S.
antitrust authorities); Regulation 4064/89, art. 7, supra note 21, at 19 (indicating the time in
which the Commission must notify parties and conduct its investigation).
221. See, e.g., International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6201,
6207; see also Varney, supra note 11, at 12-14, 16 (suggesting that parties subject to investigations
could help coordination of U.S. and EU antitrust investigations by waiving confidentiality re-
quirements and noting that coordination in the Shell/Montedison case could have been more
productive if the parties agreed to waive confidentiality requirements). Such confidentiality
agreements would be made on the premise that the confidential information shared between
the antitrust authorities could not be disclosed to third parties.
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ity are complementary. The time to reconcile differences in the
authorities' opinions is prior to the time either authority renders a
decision.
CONCLUSION
The Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger provides an interesting
case study. The general consistency of the Commission's decision
suggests that even if antitrust authorities conduct legitimate merger
investigations and render decisions soundly supported by law and
past precedents, conflicts can arise.2 While a compromise was
reached in the Boeing case, the rapid globalization of the world
economy and the increasing trend to structure mergers of interna-
tional proportions, essentially ensure that future conflicts will arise.
We cannot merely wait and hope that these conflicts will continue to
resolve themselves. A deeper commitment to coordination and co-
operation in the merger field is required of both the U.S. and EU, if
healthy international competition is to be fostered and the welfare of
consumers on both sides of the Atlantic safeguarded.2
222. See supra Part V (concluding that the Commission reached a decision supported by its
own antitrust laws and precedent); see also International Co-Operation, supra note 200, at 3 (stating
that "diverging approaches of the competition authorities in Brussels and Washington made it
impossible to reach commonly accepted solutions" in the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas case).
223. See Himmelfarb, supra note 182, at 948 (supporting a strengthening of the U.S.-EU
Agreement).
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